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I.

INTRODUCTION

Around noon in a county jail, an inmate is murdered, brutally stabbed
to death.1 Three other inmates witness some of the events surrounding
the murder. After the murder, these witnesses are threatened, attacked,
and intimidated.2 Their lives are in danger if their identities are
1. Alvarado v. Superior Court, 5 P.3d 203, 206 (Cal. 2000) (“On February 6, 1993,
during the noon hour, Jose Uribe, an inmate at the Los Angeles County jail, was killed in
his cell, having been stabbed 37 times with a contraband knife described as a shank.”).
2. See id. at 206–08.
A witness in the instant case was attacked and cut in jail after the killing in this
case. The attacker was a member of the prison gang aligned with the Mexican
Mafia and warned the witness not to testify. One of the defendants in this case
threatened a witness while the witness was in protective custody and told the
witness somebody would get him. Someone wrote on a wall while a witness
was in a court holding cell that the witness was dead. And that the witness was
a snitch at the time when the witness was in protective custody.
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disclosed because the Mexican Mafia, a notorious prison gang, is
allegedly involved in the murder.3 Because of this danger, the trial court
grants the prosecutor’s request to permanently withhold the witnesses’
identities from the defense.4 On appeal, this ruling is reversed.5 The
California Supreme Court holds that the identities of these crucial
witnesses6 for the prosecution must be disclosed to the defense at trial,
despite the fact that they have been attacked and threatened by the
defendant and that such disclosure will pose a significant danger to the
witnesses’ safety.7 To withhold the identities of witnesses whose
Id. at 208. “Witness 1 further testified [before the grand jury] . . . that on the day
immediately preceding his testimony before the grand jury, he was placed in the same
jail cell as defendant Alvarado, who threatened to harm him if he testified.” Id. at
206–07. It is unclear from the Alvarado opinion if each of the three witnesses were
threatened or if the descriptive facts set forth above pertained to only one or two of the
three witnesses.
3. Id. at 207 (“The homicide is believed to have been ordered by the Mexican
Mafia, a notorious prison gang . . . .”).
4. Id. at 208 (stating the trial court’s finding that “[b]ased on the foregoing and
the other facts disclosed to the court in camera, it is clear that the witnesses 1 through 3
are in danger and that disclosure of their names would increase the risk of possible
danger to them . . . .”).
5. Id. at 223.
6. The phrase “crucial witnesses” is not defined in the California Supreme
Court’s opinion. However, in the court of appeal opinion, which was superseded, the
court described crucial witnesses as those “without whom the state has no viable case”
and who are not “peripheral, cumulative, or minor.” Alvarado v. Superior Court, 60 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 854, 861 (Ct. App. 1997), rev’d, 5 P.3d 203 (Cal. 2000). The terms “victim”
and “witness” will be used interchangeably in this Article, and the use of one term will
necessarily be intended to include the other. Furthermore, the issue addressed herein is
limited to crucial witnesses as defined in this paragraph.
7. See Alvarado, 5 P.3d at 205.
[T]he trial court and the Court of Appeal erred in determining that, when the
risk to a witness is sufficiently grave, the identity of the witness may be
permanently withheld from a defendant and the witness may testify
anonymously at trial even when the witness is a crucial prosecution witness
and withholding the witness’s identity will impair significantly the defendant’s
ability to investigate and cross-examine the witness.
Id.
Thus, under the cases discussed above, should the witnesses provide such
crucial testimony at trial, the confrontation clause would prohibit the
prosecution from relying upon this testimony while refusing to disclose the
identities of the witnesses under circumstances in which such nondisclosure
would significantly impair the defense’s ability to investigate or effectively
cross-examine them.
Id. at 220; id. at 221 (“At trial, however, the confrontation clause imposes greater
demands upon the prosecution in that defendants must be afforded an adequate
opportunity to confront and cross-examine effectively the witnesses who testify against
them.”); id. at 223 (“Thus, when nondisclosure of the identity of a crucial witness will
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veracity and credibility are central to the prosecution’s case would, the
court concludes, significantly impair the defense’s ability to effectively
investigate and cross-examine the witnesses as required by the
defendant’s Sixth Amendment8 right of confrontation.9 As this Article
will show, the Alvarado holding is very narrow, requiring disclosure
only when a witness is crucial to the prosecution and when the witness’s
credibility is at issue.
The interesting issue left unresolved by Alvarado is whether the
identity of a crucial witness whose credibility is not at issue must be
disclosed to the defense at trial when the witness has been threatened
and attacked by the defendant or at the defendant’s behest.10 Or,
whether because of that intimidation, the defendant has waived his right
of confrontation as to the witness’s identity. This question is ripe for
exploration for several reasons. First, as this Article shows, witness
intimidation is a national problem.11 Second, waiver by intimidation
preclude effective investigation and cross-examination of that witness, the confrontation
clause does not permit the prosecution to rely upon the testimony of that witness at trial
while refusing to disclose his or her identity.”).
8. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in relevant
part, that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be
confronted with the witnesses against him . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
9. The Court in Alvarado limited its decision to federal law. See Alvarado, 5
P.3d at 211 & n.5. Therefore, only federal issues will be addressed in this Article.
Recently, the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari and declined to hear this
case. California v. Alvarado, 532 U.S. 990 (2001).
10. It should be noted that even though one of the defendants in Alvarado had
attacked one of the witnesses, at trial the prosecution proceeded on the theory that it was
the Mexican Mafia, not the defendants, who were a threat to the witness’s safety. See
Alvarado, 5 P.3d at 207–08.
[T]he trial court’s finding that the safety of the witnesses would be endangered
by disclosure of their identities was based upon the premise that the danger to
the witnesses was posed by the Mexican Mafia, not by the individual
defendants in this case. Under this circumstance, we do not believe that the
denial of disclosure can be sustained on a waiver theory.
Id. at 221 n.12.
11. See id. at 222 n.14.
At oral argument, the People pointed out that during the past five years in Los
Angeles County alone, the prosecution has filed special circumstance
allegations stemming from the murder of witnesses in 25 cases, is investigating
1,600 cases of witness intimidation, and “can’t get witnesses to come forward
in over 1,000 gang murders. Why? Because we cannot protect them [the
witnesses].”
Id. (alteration in original); see also Carol J. DeFrances et al., Prosecutors in State
Courts, 1994, in OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN 1 (1996) (reporting that across the nation “75% of the
[prosecutor’s] offices provided security or assistance for felony case victimes or
witnesses who had been threatened”); Kerry Murphy Healey, Victim and Witness
Intimidation: New Developments and Emerging Responses, in NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, RESEARCH IN ACTION (1995) (basing the report on interviews
with thirty-two criminal justice professionals from twenty urban jurisdictions regarding
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was raised on appeal in Alvarado, but was not fully addressed, and thus
not resolved.12 Third, the doctrine of waiver by misconduct has a long
and interesting history, which dates back to the 1600s13 and continues in
use to this date.14 Last, but not least, this issue is certain to arise in the
not so distant future.15 For all of these reasons, this Article addresses the
merits of the waiver doctrine as it relates to this issue. However, before
that can be done, it will first be necessary to clarify the limitations of the
holding in Alvarado, the nature and scope of the Sixth Amendment right
of confrontation, and the nature of witness intimidation and witness
rights, and to explore witness protection programs and what alternatives
to identity disclosure, if any, exist.

the issue of witness intimindation); NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
PREVENTING GANG- AND DRUG-RELATED WITNESS INTIMINDATION vii (1996) (“A number
of law enforcement agencies and prosecutors’ offices across the country have already
taken steps to prevent witness intimidation.”).
12. See id. at 221 n.12 (“Although they did not raise the issue in the trial court, the
People now contend that . . . defendants, by threatening certain witnesses, waived any
constitutional right to obtain disclosure of the witnesses’ identities.”).
13. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158 (1878).
14. See infra Part V.A.
15. Unfortunately, only a few studies have been conducted about witness
intimidation, but those results indicate its existence across the country. Witness
intimidation occurs most frequently in gang cases. Since 1993, the number of gang
members in California increased from 175,000 to 200,000 to 300,000 in 1999. BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION, CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CALIFORNIA GANGS BY THE NEXT
MILLENNIUM 1 (1999) [hereinafter NEXT MILLENIUM]. In addition, the analyses and
trends indicate that organized crime has expanded in California and in the United States.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATE OF CAL., ORGANIZED CRIME IN CALIFORNIA i–iii (1998). With
this proliferation and increase, the chance that this issue will arise is great.
Moreover, juveniles, who make up the majority of the members in criminal street
gangs, and youth violence are expected to increase by the next decade. CAL. PENAL
CODE § 13825.1 notes (a)–(n) (West 2000).
The problem of youth violence will . . . increase as the juvenile population is
projected to grow substantially by the next decade. By the year 2010 the
number of juveniles who are 15 to 17 years of age is expected to increase 31
percent. . . . Juvenile arrest rates for weapons-law violations increased 103
percent between 1985 and 1994, while juvenile killings with firearms
quadrupled between 1984 and 1994 . . . . The number of juvenile homicide
offenders in 1994 was about 2,800, nearly triple the number in 1984.
Id. at note (b).
Furthermore, intelligence information indicates that gang members fourteen through
twenty-four years of age are the most violent and tend to commit the most gang-related
homicides. That population is expected to increase by approximately thirty percent by
2006, which will result in more gang-related homicides. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN.,
CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS BULLETIN 2 (2000).
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II. UNDER ALVARADO, DISCLOSURE OF A THREATENED WITNESS’S
IDENTITY IS MANDATED ONLY WHEN CERTAIN FACTORS
ARE PRESENT
A. Introduction
The Alvarado court’s decision that withholding the identity of crucial
prosecution witnesses from the defense at trial is unconstitutional is
narrow in scope and only applies when certain circumstances are
present. The Alvarado court did not decide the interesting question left
open by the United States Supreme Court in Smith v. Illinois,16 namely,
whether the Sixth Amendment is violated when the identity of a
threatened witness is withheld from the defense at trial, when credibility
issues are not extant.17
B. The Facts of Alvarado
1.

The Murder

Alvarado involved a prison murder. The defendants, the victim, and
the three witnesses were all inmates in county jail at the time of the
homicide.18 The two defendants, Joaquin Alvarado and Jorge Lopez,

16. Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129 (1968).
17. In Smith, the United States Supreme Court held that a defendant’s Sixth
Amendment right of confrontation was violated when the defense was denied the right to
ask the real name and address of one of the prosecution’s witness. See id. at 131. There
was no evidence that the witness in Smith had been threatened by the defendant. See id.
at 134. In his concurring opinion, Justice White intimated that cross-examination of a
witness may be limited by the trial judge when it would endanger the safety of the
witness.
In Alford v. United States, the Court recognized that questions which tend
merely to harass, annoy, or humiliate a witness may go beyond the bounds of
proper cross-examination. I would place in the same category those inquiries
which tend to endanger the personal safety of the witness. But in these
situations if the question asked is one that is normally permissible, the State or
the witness should at the very least come forward with some showing of why
the witness must be excused from answering the question. The trial judge can
then ascertain the interest of the defendant in the answer and exercise an
informed discretion in making his ruling. Here the State gave no reasons
justifying the refusal to answer a quite usual and proper question.
Id. at 133–34 (White, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
18. See Alvarado, 5 P.3d at 206–07. The case came before the court of appeal by a
writ of mandate, filed by the defendants, after the trial court authorized permanent
nondisclosure of the witnesses’ identities. The court of appeal affirmed the trial court’s
ruling, and the defendants then filed a petition for review before the California Supreme
Court. See id. at 208–10. The only facts stated in the opinion are those recounted from
the grand jury transcript of proceedings, which is summarized in the opinion. The grand
jury proceedings were held in lieu of a preliminary hearing. See id. at 208–09.
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were charged with the murder of inmate Jose Uribe.19 According to the
grand jury testimony, the victim, Jose Uribe, was housed in cell ten. The
three witnesses are referred to in the transcript of the testimony as
witnesses one, two, and three.20 Witnesses one and two were housed,
respectively, in cells twelve and eleven. Witness three was a jail trusty,
assigned to sweep the cell module in which the murder occurred.21
Before lunch, on the day of the murder, witness one saw Frank
Marquez at his cell and heard Marquez ask one of witness one’s
cellmates for some extra jail clothing. He also heard Marquez say
something about a snitch. Because witness one wanted to curry favor
with the Hispanic inmates, he gave his own shirt to Marquez. During
lunch, witness one remained in his cell. He saw Marquez, Alvarado,
Lopez, and two other inmates near his cell. He then heard an altercation,
and afterward saw the same five inmates leave the area.22
On the morning of the same day, witness two saw Marquez arrive at
his cell and heard Marquez talk to his cellmates. Marquez told witness
two that “a snitch was going to be dealt with in cell No. 10” and that
witness two should “stay away from cell No. 10.”23 About ten minutes
later, witness two heard a black trusty tell some black inmates to stay
away from the end of the row, which is where cell ten was located.
Witness two also remained in his cell during lunch. Around noon,
witness two saw Alvarado and Lopez enter cell ten with a third inmate
and thereafter heard a fight. He heard someone say something about
being a snitch. Immediately thereafter, witness two saw Lopez give a
bloody shirt to Marquez, who was standing outside cell ten. He also saw
a bloody body lying under one of the beds in cell ten.24 This bloody
body was that of Jose Uribe, who had been stabbed 37 times with a
prison knife, also known as a shank.25
19. Id. at 206. A third defendant, Frank Marquez, a jail trusty, was not a codefendant. Id.
20. See id. at 206.
21. Id. at 207.
22. Id. at 206.
23. Id. at 207.
24. Id.
25. See id. at 206. The California Supreme Court omitted from its statement of
facts witness two’s testimony that during the fight inside cell ten, other inmates made
noise to drown out Uribe’s cries. See Alvarado v. Superior Court, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 854,
856 (Ct. App. 1997), rev’d, 5 P.3d 203 (Cal. 2000). That piece of information is
important, because it indicates planning, organization, and premeditation by one with
sufficient power and influence to obtain cooperation from other inmates.
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That same morning, witness three, the trusty, saw Marquez wrap a
shank inside a shirt and give it to a Hispanic inmate. After lunch, he saw
Marquez take a shirt from someone in the row of the victim’s cell.26
2.

Evidence of Witness Intimidation

During pretrial proceedings, the prosecution had ex parte hearings
before the trial judge in camera. At those hearings, the prosecution
presented evidence in an effort to establish good cause, under section
1054.7 of the California Penal Code,27 why disclosure of the witnesses’
identities should be denied.28 After hearing the evidence, the trial court
made several findings, one of which was that the homicide was ordered
by the notorious Mexican Mafia prison gang and that the defendants,
although not members, committed the murder to curry favor with the
gang.29
The trial court also found that one of the witnesses to the homicide
had been attacked and knifed after the homicide by a member of a gang
aligned with the Mexican Mafia. The attacker had warned the witness
not to testify. The trial court found that in another incident, on the day
before one of the witnesses was to testify before the grand jury,
Alvarado threatened the witness while the witness was in protective
custody.30 The court found that in a third incident, someone wrote on
the wall of a witness’s court holding cell that the witness “was dead,”
while the witness was in court.31
26.
27.

Alvarado, 5 P.3d at 207.
California Penal Code section 1054.7 provides:
The disclosures required under this chapter shall be made at least 30 days
prior to the trial, unless good cause is shown why a disclosure should be
denied, restricted, or deferred. If the material and information becomes known
to, or comes into the possession of, a party within 30 days of trial, disclosure
shall be made immediately, unless good cause is shown why a disclosure
should be denied, restricted, or deferred. “Good cause” is limited to threats or
possible danger to the safety of a victim of witness, possible loss or destruction
of evidence, or possible compromise of other investigations by law
enforcement.
Upon the request of any party, the court may permit a showing of good
cause for the denial or regulation of disclosures, or any portion of that
showing, to be made in camera. A verbatim record shall be made of any such
proceeding. If the court enters an order granting relief following a showing in
camera, the entire record of the showing shall be sealed and preserved in the
records of the court, and shall be made available to an appellate court in the
event of an appeal or writ. In its discretion, the trial court may after trial and
conviction, unseal an previously sealed matter.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1054.7 (West 1985 & Supp. 2002).
28. Alvarado, 5 P.3d at 207.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 206–07.
31. Id. at 208, 209 n.2.
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Even though the trial court expressed concerns about the effect of its
ruling and acknowledged that the defense would not be able to
investigate the witnesses without knowing their names, the court
nevertheless concluded that the three witnesses were “in danger and that
disclosure of their names would increase the risk of possible danger to
them.”32
It should be noted that even though evidence established that one of
the defendants, Alvarado, was involved in the intimidation of one of the
three witnesses, the trial court named only the Mexican Mafia, and not
any of the defendants, as the source of witness intimidation.33 This fact
becomes extremely important when considering the People’s attempt to
rely on the waiver by intimidation argument discussed later.34
3. The Discovery Problems
The prosecution provided discovery to the defense which included the
transcripts of the grand jury proceedings; information about the three
witnesses’ custodial status; the module, row, and cell number of the
three witnesses at the time of the homicide; the three witnesses’ prior
criminal histories and police reports of their prior crimes; copies of
interviews with other inmates; the names and photographs of thirty-three
other inmates who were in the module where the killing occurred on that
day; and the names of all inmates who were in a nearby county jail
module.35 But the prosecution did not give the witnesses’ true names,
nor their photographs to the defense.36
The defense maintained that without knowing the witnesses’
identities, they would not be able to effectively cross-examine the
witnesses at trial for the following reasons:
[The defense] will be unable to determine whether the witnesses (1) were present at
the time and place of the killing, (2) harbored grudges against either or both
defendants, (3) had a motive to kill the victim themselves and accuse defendants in
order to dispel suspicion from themselves, (4) made inconsistent statements to others
regarding relevant aspects of the case, and (5) had reputations for dishonesty.37

32. Id. at 208.
33. See id. at 207–08, 209 n.2, 221 n.12.
34. See id. at 221 n.12.
35. Alvarado v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. 4th 1121, 1128 n.2 (Cal. 2000) (reporting
information that was deleted from the opinion published in the Pacific Reporter).
36. Alvarado, 5 P.3d at 207.
37. Id. at 221.
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The California Supreme Court agreed with the defendants’
contentions. It found that without the sought-after information, the
defendants would be precluded from having information necessary for
effective cross-examination.38
For these reasons, the Alvarado court vacated the trial court’s order,
which allowed the prosecution permanently to withhold the identity of
its three witnesses from the defense.39 It further ordered the trial court to
fashion a new order consistent with the court’s expressed conclusions,
which could deny, restrict, or defer “disclosure of the identity of each
witness before trial . . . as long as that order does not impermissibly
impair defendants’ right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses
effectively at trial.”40 Thus, assuming all circumstances are the same on
remand, the identity of the witnesses must be given to the defendants at
trial.41
C. The Identity of Crucial Witnesses, Whose Credibility Is at Issue,
Must Be Disclosed
Without a doubt, the Alvarado decision is a narrow one, limited to
those cases where credibility of crucial prosecution witnesses is at issue.
As will be shown, this view is supported by the cases the court cited in
its opinion, the factual nature of the case itself, and the express
statements of the court.
In reaching its decision, the California Supreme Court relied mainly
on the Smith case.42 Not once, but twice, the court quoted the same
passage from Smith to the effect that when credibility is the main issue, a
witness may not testify anonymously:
38. The California Supreme Court quoted at length from the court of appeal
opinion about the difficulties involved:
[D]efense counsel “will have difficulty obtaining complete information about
the witnesses’ location and ability to observe and testify about the crime[,] . . .
[and] will be unable to [obtain] complete impeaching information, such as the
witnesses’ reputation for truthfulness or dishonesty, previous history and
accuracy of providing information to law enforcement, and other motives to
fabricate, such as revenge or reduction or dismissal of their own charges.”
Indeed, without access to either the witnesses’ names or their photographs,
defense counsel are unlikely to be able to conduct an adequate investigation of
the witnesses or of the veracity of their testimony, or challenge the accuracy of
the information concerning the witnesses provided by the prosecution, including
their prior criminal records or the benefits that may have been provided to them
in return for their testimony.
Id. (alteration in original).
39. See id. at 206, 221, 223.
40. Id. at 206.
41. See id. at 223.
42. See id. at 206, 215 & n.8, 220 n.11.
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[W]hen the credibility of a witness is in issue, the very starting point in
‘exposing falsehood and bringing out the truth’ through cross-examination must
necessarily be to ask the witness who he is and where he lives. The witness’[s]
name and address open countless avenues of in-court examination and out-ofcourt investigation. To forbid this most rudimentary inquiry at the threshold is
effectively to emasculate the right of cross-examination itself.43

The thrust of the court’s analysis throughout its opinion was that
withholding the identities of the prosecution’s witnesses, when the
witnesses had current and prior criminal histories, possible motives to
fabricate, and questionable credibility, violated a defendant’s right of
confrontation.44
The court emphasized that “[t]he main and essential purpose of
confrontation is to secure for the opponent the opportunity of crossexamination.”45 Cross-examination is the principle mechanism by which
the defense tests witness credibility and the truth of witness statements
before the trier of fact.46 Cross-examination is used not only to test the
witness’s memory and perceptions of what occurred, but also to impeach
or discredit the witness’s testimony.47 One method used to impeach a
witness is to confront him with the fact that he has a prior felony
conviction,48 which can indicate dishonesty or “moral turpitude.”49 The
43. Id. at 205–06, 215 (alteration in original) (quoting Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S.
129, 131 (1968)).
44. See supra note 7.
[I]n every case in which the testimony of a witness has been found crucial to
the prosecution’s case the courts have determined that it is improper at trial to
withhold information (for example, the name or address of the witness)
essential to the defendant’s ability to conduct an effective cross-examination.
Alvarado, 5 P.3d at 219–20; see also id. at 220 n.11 (“Justice White’s concurring opinion
in Smith did not suggest, however, that the testimony of a crucial witness could be
admitted while withholding his or her identity, when nondisclosure of the witness’s
identity would significantly impair the defendant’s ability to investigate and crossexamine the witness.”).
45. Alvarado, 5 P.3d at 213 (quoting Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315–16
(1974) (quoting J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1395, at 123 (3d ed. 1940))).
46. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974) (“Cross-examination is the
principle means by which the believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are
tested.”).
47. Id. (“[T]he cross-examiner is not only permitted to delve into the witness’
story to test the witness’ perceptions and memory, but the cross-examiner has
traditionally been allowed to impeach, i.e., discredit, the witness.”).
48. California Evidence Code section 788 provides, in relevant part: “For the
purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, it may be shown by the examination of
the witness or by the record of the judgment that he has been convicted of a felony . . . .”
CAL. EVID. CODE § 788 (West 1995 & Supp. 2002).
49. See People v. Castro, 696 P.2d 111, 119 (Cal. 1985) (“There is then some
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theory is that one who has committed a felony that reflects a readiness to
do evil is less likely than other witnesses to be telling the truth.50 By
impeaching the witness with his prior felony conviction, the defense has
afforded the trier of fact a basis that it may use to evaluate the witness’s
credibility.
Cross-examination is also used to reveal any “possible biases,
prejudices, or ulterior motives of the witness as they may relate directly
to issues” in the trial.51 Exploration of a witness’s bias may be used to
show either that the witness’s testimony is not believable or, at the very
least, that it must be carefully evaluated in light of that bias.52 A prison
inmate may be motivated to provide information to the authorities in
exchange for special treatment, such as reduction in sentence or
prosecutorial immunity, or in response to the “coercive effect of his
detention.”53 “[P]artiality of a witness is . . . ‘always relevant as
discrediting the witness and [thus] affecting the weight of his
testimony.’”54 Defense counsel may impeach a prison inmate by
showing that, because of the witness’s current incarceration, the
witness’s testimony was an attempt to curry favor with those in power in
the prison or with the authorities, or even an attempt to draw suspicion
away from himself.55 Exposing a witness’s motivation to testify is one
of the proper and important functions of cross-examination. In this way,
it is possible to expose “facts from which [the] jurors, as the sole triers
of fact and credibility, could appropriately draw inferences relating to

basis . . . for inferring that a person who has committed a crime which involves moral
turpitude other than dishonesty is more likely to be dishonest than a witness about whom
no such thing is known.”).
50. See id. at 118. The classic statement of the rationale for felony impeachment,
written by Justice Holmes, is as follows:
[W]hen it is proved that a witness has been convicted of crime, the only
ground for disbelieving him which such proof affords is the general readiness
to do evil which the conviction may be supposed to show. It is from that
general disposition alone that the jury is asked to infer a readiness to lie in a
particular case, and thence that he has lied in fact. The evidence has no
tendency to prove that he was mistaken, but only that he has perjured himself,
and it reaches that conclusion solely through the general proposition that he is
of bad character and unworthy of credit.
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Gertz v. Fitchburg R.R., 137 Mass. 77, 78 (1884)).
51. Davis, 415 U.S. at 316.
52. See id. at 319 (“Here, however, petitioner sought to introduce evidence of
Green’s probation for the purpose of suggesting that Green was biased and, therefore,
that his testimony was either not to be believed . . . or at least very carefully considered
in that light.”).
53. Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 693 (1931).
54. Davis, 415 U.S. at 316 (quoting 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 940, at 775 (rev.
by James H. Chadbourn 1970)).
55. See Alford, 282 U.S. at 693.
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the reliability of the witness,” and hence the truth of that testimony.56
The witnesses in Alvarado were inmates in custody for violations of
the law. The discovery given to the defense disclosed that they each had
criminal histories.57 If in fact any of the three witnesses were convicted
of felonies, particularly felonies showing moral turpitude, these
convictions would provide a basis for impeachment.58 Moreover,
because the three inmates were convicts, their credibility automatically
becomes one of the prime areas for the defense to explore. Their status
as convicts alone suggests that they might have testified before the grand
jury in order to get favorable treatment for their current charges. In the
same vein, the defense would be obligated to investigate whether in the
past they had testified for the prosecution, and, if so, whether they
received a benefit in return. Furthermore, the defense would want to
explore whether any of the witnesses had worked for anyone in law
enforcement in exchange for consideration. All of these inquiries are
proper areas for defense counsel to explore because of the witnesses’
status as current inmates with a criminal past.
The Alvarado court determined that the defendants were entitled to
know the identities of the prosecution’s witnesses, prison inmates whose
credibility was at issue, in order to effectively cross-examine them. The
court did not address whether the issue of witness safety would ever
weigh in favor of nondisclosure of witness identity. As acknowledged
by the court, neither of the two cases on which the court relied, Smith59
and Alford,60 addressed the issue of witness safety.61 Indeed, the court
emphasized that even Justice White, in his concurring opinion in Smith,
did not argue that a witness’s identity should be withheld because of
safety concerns when the witness’s credibility is a major issue.62 The
court stated that its decision dealt only with “defendants’ legal claims
56. Davis, 415 U.S. at 318.
57. See Alvarado, 5 P.3d at 207, 220.
58. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 788 (West 1995 & Supp. 2002).
59. Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129 (1968).
60. Alford, 282 U.S. at 687.
61. Alvarado, 5 P.3d at 215–16 n.8 (“Neither Alford, nor Smith, addressed the
question whether nondisclosure of a witness’s identity might be justified by a need to
protect the safety of the witness.” (citations omitted)).
62. See id. at 220 n.11 (“Justice White’s concurring opinion in Smith did not
suggest, however, that the testimony of a crucial witness could be admitted while
withholding his or her identity, when nondisclosure of the witness’s identity would
significantly impair the defendant’s ability to investigate and cross-examine the
witness.”).
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regarding the propriety of the trial court’s nondisclosure order,” not with
the issue of witness safety and witness intimidation.63
Therefore, Alvarado held that a crucial witness’s identity must be
disclosed to the defense “at trial” when the witness’s credibility is in
issue.64 The fact that the safety of such witnesses has been compromised
and endangered is not a factor in deciding whether the right of
confrontation is violated by an order of nondisclosure. The court
concluded that when a crucial witness’s credibility is at issue, witness
safety issues must be dealt with in ways that the law provides, such as
witness protection programs.65 Under Alvarado, the identity of a
witness, even one who has been threatened and attacked and whose life
is in danger, must be disclosed to the defense at trial when all of the
following factors are present: (1) the witness is crucial to the
prosecution, (2) the witness’s credibility is at issue, (3) the ability to
investigate the witness will be impeded without that information, and (4)
the defense will be unable to effectively cross-examine the witness.66
What Alvarado did not decide is whether a crucial witness’s identity
may be withheld from the defense when the witness has been attacked or
intimidated by the defendant or at his behest and the witness’s credibility
is not in issue.
Despite its limited application, Alvarado opens up numerous problems
for both the prosecution and the defense. Although Alvarado applies
only to those crucial prosecution witnesses with credibility issues, one
may predict that Alvarado will have a chilling effect on individuals
reporting crimes or volunteering information about criminal activity to
the police and prosecutors once they know that their identity cannot be
shielded. Furthermore, the decision likely will have a deterrent effect on
the willingness of threatened witnesses to testify in criminal proceedings
when they are informed that the defense must know their identity.67 The
long-range effect is that criminals can threaten, harass, and intimidate
witnesses with impunity to the detriment of societal goals of prosecuting
crime and deterring criminal activity.
There are additional problems in interpreting what the phrase “at trial”
means with respect to when identity disclosure must be given to the
defense.68 Does that mean the day of pretrial motions, the first day of
jury selection, the first day of testimony, or the day the witness in
question testifies? If “at trial” refers to the day the witness testifies, then
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
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a number of logistical problems are presented for the defense. The
prospect of obtaining such information on the day of the witness’s
testimony would most likely require a request for a continuance in order
to adequately investigate the background of the witness. In turn, the
question arises how one qualifies a jury when one does not know how
long the investigation will take, if out-of-state witnesses might be
required, or if necessary witnesses are unavailable at the time of trial.
Furthermore, how does one voir dire a jury when one does not have all
the information about the criminal case, and will not have this
information until the investigation into all of the witnesses’ backgrounds
are completed? The investigation could lead to the necessity of further
research, or the possibility of unexplored defenses. All of these
possibilities could result in serious logistical problems for the defense,
possible mistrials, and delays for the trial courts.
Still more problems are presented by the Alvarado court’s suggestion
that witness protection programs are sufficient to assist threatened
witnesses.69 These and other issues are discussed in this Article. First,
however, the nature and scope of the Sixth Amendment right of
confrontation and its historical origins must be addressed.
III. THE RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION
A. Introduction
In less than twenty words, the architects of our Constitution created
one of our most important trial rights: the right of confrontation. The
Sixth Amendment grants to a criminal defendant the right to confront the
witnesses at his trial: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him . . . .”70
Although the words used are simple terms, apparently easy to
understand, a great deal of controversy and analysis has evolved as to
their meaning. Any attempt to interpret the Confrontation Clause must
begin with the historical reasons for its existence. Understanding its
historical origin assists in determining the intended purpose of the
Clause and, hence, its meaning.
Therefore, whether the Sixth
Amendment requires disclosure of threatened unidentified material
69. See id. at 222–23.
70. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Confrontation Clause is part of our Bill of Rights
and is made obligatory on the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. See Pointer v.
Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403, 406 (1965).
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witnesses, whose credibility is not in issue, depends upon the following
factors: what specific rights are included within the amendment, the
scope of those rights, whether or not there are exceptions, and what
constitutes a waiver of those rights. To answer these questions, the
historical origin of the Sixth Amendment will be discussed.
B. The Historical Origin of the Confrontation Clause
History reveals that the Confrontation Clause came into existence
because of the legal abuses that occurred in criminal trials in England
prior to the seventeenth century. Its primary purpose was to prevent the
trial of individuals based solely on accusations made anonymously or by
the use of ex parte depositions or affidavits.71
It is sufficient to note that the particular vice that gave impetus to the
confrontation claim was the practice of trying defendants on “evidence” which
consisted solely of ex parte affidavits or depositions secured by the examining
magistrates, thus denying the defendant the opportunity to challenge his accuser
in a face-to-face encounter in front of the trier of fact.72

Around 1290, a group of English officials, known as the Privy
Council, began advising the king and performing certain executive
functions. By the mid-fourteenth century, the Privy Council acted as a
court, holding hearings at Westminster in a room ornamented with the
king’s star-shaped seal. The Privy Council came to be known as the
Court of Star Chamber.73 It flourished in the late sixteenth and early
seventeenth centuries,74 and heard cases involving, among other things,
the misuse of judicial power, perjury, contempt, and forgery.
Punishment ranged from torture, imprisonment, and mutilation, to the
imposition of a fine.75
Defendants before the Star Chamber were required to have counsel,
and the defendant’s answer to an indictment was not accepted unless
signed by his counsel. If counsel refused to sign the answer, the
defendant was deemed to have confessed.76 If the defendant did provide
an answer signed by his counsel, the court would then require the
71. See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 362 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“The
Court consistently has indicated that the primary purpose of the [Confrontation] Clause
was to prevent the abuses that had occurred in England.”).
72. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 156 (1970); see also Mattox v. United
States, 156 U.S. 237, 242 (1895) (“The primary object of the constitutional provision in
question was to prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits, such as were sometimes
admitted . . . being used against the prisoner in lieu of a personal examination and crossexamination of the witness . . . .”).
73. United States v. Gecas, 120 F.3d 1419, 1446 (11th Cir. 1997).
74. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 821 (1975).
75. Gecas, 120 F.3d at 1446.
76. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 821–22.
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defendant to answer interrogatories submitted by his accuser.77 Refusal
to answer any of the interrogatories would be met with a fine of twenty
shillings. If the defendant refused again, the fine would double and the
defendant would be imprisoned until an answer was given. A defendant
could remain in prison indefinitely for a refusal to answer these
questions.78
Some authorities have stated that trials in the Star Chamber were
public, but that witnesses against the accused were examined privately,
with no opportunity given to the defendant to discredit them.79 The
accused was questioned secretly, often tortured, in an effort to obtain a
confession.80
In 16th-century England, magistrates interrogated the prisoner, accomplices, and others
prior to trial. These interrogations were intended only for the information of the
court. The prisoner had no right to be, and probably never was, present. At the
trial itself, proof was usually given by reading depositions, confessions of
accomplices, letters, and the like; and this occasioned frequent demands by the
prisoner to have his ‘accusers,’ i.e., the witnesses against him, brought before
him, face to face . . . . There was . . . no appreciation at all of the necessity of
calling a person to the stand as a witness”; rather, it was common practice to
obtain “information by consulting informed persons not called into court.81

After the Star Chamber ended, the notion of obligatory counsel
disappeared—defendants were not represented by counsel in the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in England.82 Sir Walter Raleigh’s
trial for treason was in 1603, and presumably he did not have counsel.83
A crucial element of the evidence against [Raleigh] consisted of the statements
of one Cobham, implicating Raleigh in a plot to seize the throne.84 Raleigh had

77. Gecas, 120 F.3d at 1446.
78. Id. at 1447.
79. See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 361–62 (1992); Faretta, 422 U.S. at
823–24 & n.21; California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 156–58 & n.9 (1970); In re Oliver,
333 U.S. 257, 269–70 & nn.21–22 (1948); Gecas, 120 F.3d at 1446–50; United States v.
Cojab, 996 F.2d 1404, 1407 (2d Cir. 1993); Margaret A. Berger, The
Deconstitutionalization of the Confrontation Clause: A Proposal for a Prosecutorial
Restraint Model, 76 MINN. L. REV. 557, 569–70 (1992).
80. Oliver, 333 U.S. at 270 n.22 (“Apparently all authorities agree that the accused
himself was grilled in secret, often tortured, in an effort to obtain a confession . . . .”); see also
White, 502 U.S. at 361; Gecas, 120 F.3d at 1446.
81. White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 361 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring) (citations
omitted) (internal quotes omitted) (alteration in original).
82. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 823.
83. Green, 399 U.S. at 157 n.10.
84. Cobham confessed as well, but it was believed that his confession had been
obtained by torture. Id. at 157 n.22; White, 502 U.S. at 361–62.
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since received a written retraction from Cobham, and believed that Cobham
would now testify in his favor. After a lengthy dispute over Raleigh’s right to
have Cobham called as a witness, Cobham was not called, and Raleigh was
convicted.85

Around the middle of the seventeenth century when the Puritans left
England for the American colonies, a national debate arose in England
about the Star Chamber and the British monarchy.86 The trial of a
tailor’s apprentice, John Lilburne, resulted in his writing and circulating
a number of documents condemning the monarchy’s power. Members
of the English Parliament sympathized with these writings, and in 1641,
the Star Chamber was abolished.87 The appellation “Star Chamber” has
since become synonymous with abuses of people’s rights.88 Over a
century later, in 1791, the Sixth Amendment was ratified.89
C. The Rights to Cross-Examine and Physically Confront One’s
Accusers Are Included in the Clause
The historical origin of the Clause reveals that its purpose is to
provide specific trial procedures to promote the reliability and the
integrity of evidence presented in a criminal trial.90 The drafters
particularly sought to prevent trials based on unreliable hearsay. In
contrast to the prior practice of trying defendants with evidence
presented by unnamed witnesses and by written statements, without any
opportunity to test that evidence, 91 it is submitted that the Clause
85. Green, 399 U.S. at 157 n.10.
86. See Gecas, 120 F.3d at 1449.
87. Id. at 1449–50; see e.g., In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 266 (1948).
88. Alvarado v. Superior Court, 5 P.3d 203, 214 n.7 (Cal. 2000) (citing Faretta v.
California, 422 U.S. 806, 821 (1975)).
89. See Oliver, 333 U.S. at 267. The right to a public trial did not exist in this
country until 1776. See id. at 266–67. Prior to that time, a common law requirement
of confrontation had developed. See id. at 266–67 & n.14; White, 502 U.S. at 361–62
(Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Salinger v. United States, 272 U.S. 542, 548
(1926)).
90. See White, 502 U.S. at 356–57 (“[T]he Confrontation Clause has as a basic
purpose the promotion of the ‘integrity of the factfinding process.’”); Ohio v. Roberts,
448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980) (“[The] underlying purpose [of the Clause is] to augment
accuracy in the factfinding process by ensuring the defendant an effective means to test
adverse evidence . . . .”).
The decisions of this Court make it clear that the mission of the Confrontation
Clause is to advance a practical concern for the accuracy of the truthdetermining process in criminal trials by assuring that ‘the trier of fact [has] a
satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior statement.
Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970) (alteration in original).
91. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 156 (1970).
[T]he particular vice that gave impetus to the [Confrontation Clause] was the
practice of trying defendants on “evidence” which consisted solely of ex
parte affidavits or depositions secured by the examining magistrates, thus
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mandates several changes. First, it prescribes the setting in which a
criminal trial will proceed.
Second, it mandates preliminary
requirements as to the admission of evidence. And last, but most
importantly, it provides certain rights to the accused.92
As to the first level of protection, the Clause requires a trial set in a
court of law, which is meant to impress on those present both the
seriousness and solemnity of the proceedings.93 The second level of
protection generally requires that the accused and the prosecution
witnesses are present before the trier of fact.94 The trier of fact, the final
determiner of what in fact occurred, is able to observe the demeanor of
the witnesses as they testify, thus permitting a basis for assessing their
credibility.95 The witness is compelled “to stand face to face with the
jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon
the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is
worthy of belief.”96
The witnesses, in turn, give their statements under oath, swear to tell
the truth, and their testimony is then subjected to rigorous testing.97 The
physical presence of the accused is meant to contribute to the reliability

Id.

denying the defendant the opportunity to challenge his accuser in a face-to-face
encounter in front of the trier of fact.

92. See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 846 (1990) (stating that the purpose of
the Confrontation Clause is served by “ensuring that evidence admitted against an
accused is reliable and subject to the rigorous adversarial testing”); Lee v. Illinois, 476
U.S. 530, 548 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (stating that the Confrontation Clause
advances the determination of truth “by assuring that the ‘trier of fact [has] a satisfactory
basis for evaluating the truth of the [testimony]’” (quoting Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74,
89 (1970))); Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1016 (1985) (stating that “the Confrontation
Clause guarantees the defendant a face-to-face meeting with witnesses appearing before
the trier of fact”).
93. See Craig, 497 U.S. at 845–46.
94. See id. at 845. As will be discussed, the presence of witnesses is not always
required, because certain hearsay statements are admissible without a confrontation
violation. See e.g., Dutton, 400 U.S. at 80; Green, 399 U.S. at 153, 158. Additionally, a
defendant’s presence may be waived, either expressly or implicitly. Diaz v. United
States, 223 U.S. 442, 450–51 (1912).
95. Craig, 497 U.S. at 845–46 (1990).
96. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242–43 (1895).
97. See Craig, 497 U.S. at 846.
The combined effect of these elements of confrontation—physical presence,
oath, cross-examination, and observation of demeanor by the trier of fact—
serves the purposes of the Confrontation Clause by ensuring that evidence
admitted against an accused is reliable and subject to the rigorous adversarial
testing that is the norm of Anglo-American criminal proceedings.
Id.
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of the evidence by bolstering the likelihood that witnesses will tell the
truth. Facing a defendant while testifying under oath impresses upon
witnesses the seriousness of the matter and subjects witnesses to the
penalty of perjury if they lie.98 It also acknowledges the truth of the
maxim that it is harder to tell a lie to another’s face.99
The perception that confrontation is essential to fairness has persisted over
the centuries because there is much truth to it. A witness “may feel quite
differently when he has to repeat his story looking at the man whom he will
harm greatly by distorting or mistaking the facts. . . .” It is always more
difficult to tell a lie about a person “to his face” than “behind his back.” In the
former context, even if the lie is told, it will often be told less convincingly.
The Confrontation Clause does not, of course, compel the witness to fix his eyes
upon the defendant; he may studiously look elsewhere, but the trier of fact will
draw its own conclusions. Thus the right to face-to-face confrontation serves
much the same purpose as a less explicit component of the Confrontation
Clause . . . the right to cross-examine the accuser; both “ensur[e] the integrity of
the factfinding process.”100

Finally, the Clause provides a third level of protection by conferring
upon the accused certain rights, whether characterized as explicit,
implied, or collateral.101 No one will dispute that the Clause explicitly
sets forth the constitutional right of a criminal defendant to confront his
accusers face-to-face.102 What is disputed is whether and to what extent,
if any, and under what circumstances, that the right of face-to-face
confrontation may be outweighed by other concerns such as public
policy,103 the necessities of the case,104 waiver,105 or hearsay
objections.106 Because these other concerns do exist, and because the
98. See id. at 845–46.
99. See Coy, 487 U.S. at 1018 (“The phrase still persists, ‘Look me in the eye and
say that.’”).
100. Id. at 1019–20 (citations omitted) (alteration in original); see also Ohio v.
Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 n.6 (1980) (noting that it is more difficult to lie against an
accused who is present at trial).
101. See Craig, 497 U.S. at 862 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The Confrontation Clause
guarantees not only what it explicitly provides for—‘face-to-face’ confrontation—but
also implied and collateral rights . . . .”).
102. See Coy, 487 U.S. at 1016 (“We have never doubted, therefore, that the
Confrontation Clause guarantees the defendant a face-to-face meeting with witnesses
appearing before the trier of fact.”); id. at 1017 (“More recently, we have described the
‘literal right to “confront” the witness at the time of trial’ as forming ‘the core of the
values furthered by the Confrontation Clause.’” (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S.
149, 157 (1970))).
103. See id. at 1021; Craig, 497 U.S. at 850; Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237,
243 (1895).
104. Craig, 497 U.S. at 850; Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243.
105. See Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 106 (1934); Diaz v. United States,
223 U.S. 442, 450–51 (1912); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158 (1878).
106. See Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 598 (1994); White v. Illinois,
502 U.S. 346, 348–49 (1992); Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 813–14 (1990); United
States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 391 (1986); Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 67–68 (1980);
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scope and application of this right is not specified in the Clause, a literal
interpretation has been rejected in favor of the view that facial
confrontation is preferred, but not required.107 A literal interpretation of
facial confrontation would result in the inadmissibility of all hearsay
evidence, a result considered both unwarranted and extreme.108
One might assume, given the historical reasons for the Clause and its
specific language, that face-to-face confrontation would be the primary
right conferred on defendants. After all, it was the rejection of trial by
anonymous, unsworn accusers, and trial by paper evidence, untested and
unchallenged, without the accused knowing who his accusers were or
seeing them in court, that gave rise to the enactment of the Clause.
However, because the main purpose of the Clause is the advancement of
reliable evidence, the Court’s current view is that cross-examination is
the essential right conferred by the Sixth Amendment.109 “[T]he mission
Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 80 (1970); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 156 (1970).
107. Craig, 497 U.S. at 849 (“‘[T]he Confrontation Clause reflects a preference for
face-to-face confrontation at trial,’ a preference that ‘must occasionally give way to
considerations of public policy and the necessities of the case.’” (citations omitted)
(italics in original)); id. at 844 (“We have never held, however, that the Confrontation
Clause guarantees criminal defendants the absolute right to a face-to-face meeting with
witnesses against them at trial.”); Roberts, 448 U.S. at 64 (“The Court, however, has
recognized that competing interests, if ‘closely examined,’ may warrant dispensing with
confrontation at trial.” (citation omitted)).
For a spirited dissent and objections to this interpretation, see Justice Scalia’s dissent
in Craig, wherein he summarized and critically concluded:
This reasoning abstracts from the right to its purposes, and then eliminates the
right. It is wrong because the Confrontation Clause does not guarantee reliable
evidence; it guarantees specific trial procedures that were thought to assure
reliable evidence, undeniably among which was “face-to-face” confrontation.
Whatever else it may mean in addition, the defendant’s constitutional right “to
be confronted with the witnesses against him” means, always and everywhere,
at least what it explicitly says: the “‘right to meet face to face all those who
appear and give evidence at trial.’”
Craig, 497 U.S. at 862 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
108. Craig, 497 U.S. at 849 (“Given our hearsay cases, the word ‘confronted,’ as
used in the Confrontation Clause, cannot simply mean face-to-face confrontation . . . .”);
Dutton, 400 U.S. at 80 (“It is not argued, nor could it be, that the constitutional right to
confrontation requires that no hearsay evidence can ever be introduced.”); Wright, 497
U.S. at 813 (“From the earliest days of our Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, we have
consistently held that the Clause does not necessarily prohibit the admission of hearsay
statements against a criminal defendant, even though the admission of such statements
might be thought to violate the literal terms of the Clause.”); Bourjaily v. United States,
483 U.S. 171, 182 (1987) (“While a literal interpretation of the Confrontation Clause
could bar the use of any out-of-court statements when the declarant is unavailable, this
Court has rejected that view as ‘unintended and too extreme.’”).
109. See Craig, 497 U.S. at 845.

1185

FINALCASSANI2.DOC

2/4/2020 12:58 PM

of the Confrontation Clause is to advance a practical concern for the
accuracy of the truth-determining process in criminal trials by assuring
that ‘the trier of fact [has] a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth [of
the witness’s testimony].’”110 Through cross-examination, this mission
is accomplished.
Cross-examination is permitted not only to explore the witness’s
account of the events, but also to test the witness’s perception and
memory, and to impeach or discredit the witness.111 Through crossexamination, it is possible to show that a witness is biased, or that the
testimony is exaggerated or not believable.112 Moreover, a witness’s
expectation of leniency on a pending criminal case in exchange for his
testimony, or even for immunity from prosecution, are proper areas
subject to cross-examination.113 When the prosecution’s case depends
upon “testimony of individuals whose memory might be faulty or
who . . . [might be] motivated by malice, vindictiveness, intolerance,
prejudice, . . . jealousy,” or revenge, cross-examination is available to
expose those biases and infirmities.114
Cross-examination is also available to identify the witness “with his
community so that independent testimony may be sought and offered of
his reputation for veracity in his own neighborhood” for purposes of

The central concern of the Confrontation Clause is to ensure the reliability of
the evidence against a criminal defendant by subjecting it to rigorous testing in
the context of an adversary proceeding before the trier of fact. The word
“confront,” after all, also means a clashing of forces or ideas, thus carrying
with it the notion of adversariness.
Id. “Although face-to-face confrontation forms ‘the core of the values furthered by the
Confrontation Clause’ we have nevertheless recognized that it is not the sine qua non of
the confrontation right.” Id. at 847 (citation omitted). “[T]he Confrontation Clause is
generally satisfied when the defense is given a full and fair opportunity to probe and
expose [testimonial] infirmities . . . through cross-examination . . . .” Id. (alteration in
original) (quoting Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 22 (1985)). “The main and
essential purpose of confrontation is to secure for the opponent the opportunity of crossexamination.” Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 19–20 (1985) (quoting 5 J.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1395, at 123 (3d ed. 1940)). “The Court has emphasized that the
Confrontation Clause reflects a preference for face-to-face confrontation at trial, and that
‘a primary interest secured by [the provision] is the right of cross-examination.’”
Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63 (alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting Douglas v.
Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418 (1965)).
110. Dutton, 400 U.S. at 89 (second alteration in original) (quoting California v.
Green, 399 U.S. 149, 161 (1970)); see also Inadi, 475 U.S. at 396 (stating that the
“Confrontation Clause’s very mission . . . is to advance the accuracy of the truth
determining process in criminal trials” (internal quotes omitted) (quoting Tennessee v.
Street, 471 U.S. 409, 415 (1985) (quoting Dutton, 400 U.S. at 89))).
111. See Fensterer, 474 U.S. at 19; Roberts, 448 U.S. at 71.
112. See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 51–52 (1987).
113. See Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 693 (1931).
114. Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496 (1959).
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impeachment or bias.115 Because it is unknown in advance what
responses will actually be obtained, wide latitude is given in crossexamination.116 But that latitude is not without limits. Although an
accused has a right to cross-examination, the trial court also has a duty to
protect a witness from questions that go beyond the scope of proper
cross-examination, such as questions intended to harass, annoy, or
humiliate a witness.117 Moreover, “inquiries which tend to endanger the
personal safety of the witness,”118 upon a proper showing, are considered
improper.119
Many of the cases that deal with Sixth Amendment confrontation
involve improper limitations on the scope of cross-examination.120
However, “[c]ross-examination is not improperly curtailed if the jury is
in possession of facts sufficient to make a ‘discriminating appraisal’ of
the particular witness’s credibility.”121 Indeed, a defendant’s right to
cross-examination is not without limits. “Defendants cannot run
roughshod, doing precisely as they please simply because crossexamination is underway. So long as a reasonably complete picture of
the witness’s veracity, bias, and motivation is developed, [the trial court
has the] power and discretion to set appropriate boundaries.”122
Nevertheless, when credibility is in issue, cross-examination may be
used to inquire into the witness’s background, identity, and community.123
But even under these circumstances, there is no fixed rule, and
disclosure will depend on the particular case, balancing the public

115. Alford, 282 U.S. at 691.
116. Id. at 692.
117. Id. at 694.
118. Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129, 133–34 (1968) (White, J., concurring).
119. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986) (“[T]rial judges retain
wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable
limits on such cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things,
harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, [and] the witness’ safety . . . .”).
120. See Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1016 (1988).
121. United States v. Sasso, 59 F.3d 341, 347 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting United States
v. Roldan-Zapata, 916 F.2d 795, 806 (2d Cir. 1940) (quoting United States v. Singh, 628
F.2d 758, 763 (2d Cir. 1980))).
122. United States v. Boylan, 898 F.2d 230, 254 (1st Cir. 1990).
123. See Smith, 390 U.S. at 131 (“Yet when the credibility of a witness is in issue,
the very starting point in ‘exposing falsehood and bringing out the truth’ through crossexamination must necessarily be to ask the witness who he is and where he lives.”
(footnote omitted)); Alford, 282 U.S. at 692 (“Prejudice ensues from a denial of the
opportunity to place the witness in his proper setting and put the weight of his testimony
and his credibility to a test, without which the jury cannot fairly appraise them.”).
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interest in nondisclosure against the defendant’s interest.124 This is so
even when there is a material witness and credibility is in issue, because
other considerations, such as witness safety, may have an impact on the
disclosure of the witness’s identity.125 This subject is dealt with in
depth, as is the subject of waiver, in another Part.126 At this point, it is
sufficient to note that confrontation rights may be limited by trial
judges127 and public policy concerns,128 and may be waived by a
defendant expressly,129 or by misconduct.130
D. The Right of Confrontation Is Not Absolute
Our society places a high value on human life and liberty, which is
reflected in the many protections provided to defendants in criminal
trials.131 Those accused of crimes and those who prosecute crimes are
not on equal footing. The government not only has the power of
indictment, but also extensive resources for investigators, experts, and
other costs associated with criminal proceedings, that far exceed those
available to individuals accused of crimes.132 Many of the protections of
the Bill of Rights attempt to equalize the advantages between these two
124. See Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 62 (1957).
We believe that no fixed rule with respect to disclosure is justifiable. The
problem is one that calls for balancing the public interest in protecting the flow
of information against the individual’s right to prepare his defense. Whether a
proper balance renders nondisclosure erroneous must depend on the particular
circumstances of each case, taking into consideration the crime charged, the
possible defenses, the possible significance of the informer’s testimony, and
other relevant factors.
Id. See also McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 311 (1967) (“What Roviaro thus makes
clear is that this Court was unwilling to impose any absolute rule requiring disclosure of
an informer’s identity even in formulating evidentiary rules for federal criminal trials.”).
125. See Smith, 390 U.S. at 133 (“There is a duty to protect [a witness] from
questions which go beyond the bounds of proper cross-examination merely to harass,
annoy or humiliate him . . . .” (quoting Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 694
(1931))); id. at 133–34 (White, J., concurring) (“I would place in the same category those
inquiries which tend to endanger the personal safety of the witness.”); Delaware v. Van
Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986) (“On the contrary, trial judges retain wide latitude
insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on such
cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice,
confusion of the issues, [and] the witness’ safety . . . .”).
126. See infra Parts IV–V.
127. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679.
128. See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 844–45 (1990); Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S.
1012, 1020–21 (1988) (citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64 (1980) (citing Mattox v.
United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895))).
129. See Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 936–37 (1991); Diaz v. United
States, 223 U.S. 442, 452–53 (1912).
130. See Diaz, 223 U.S. at 452; Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158 (1878).
131. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361–62 (1970).
132. Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 480 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring).
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parties in criminal prosecutions.133 These protections, such as the right
of confrontation and the right to counsel, are intended to promote the
integrity of the adversary process, the search for truth, and the assurance
of a fair trial.
“Society wins not only when the guilty are convicted but when
criminal trials are fair.”134 While it is true that “[t]he dual aim of our
criminal justice system is ‘that guilt shall not escape nor innocence
suffer,’”135 various protections ensure that the system’s aim is not
achieved at the expense of fairness. A fair trial fosters confidence in the
criminal system and in our government. In search of truth, criminal
trials must preserve the integrity of the adversary process by fostering
procedures that promote the presentation of reliable evidence and reject
unreliable evidence.136
The ends of criminal justice would be defeated if judgments were to be founded
on a partial or speculative presentation of the facts. The very integrity of the
judicial system and public confidence in the system depend on full disclosure of
all the facts, within the framework of the rules of evidence.137

The integrity of the adversary process is also promoted by the
requirement that guilt be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.138 The
principle that “it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let the
guilty man go free” is reflected by this standard of proof.139 The
standard further protects the integrity of criminal trials by shifting the
burden of persuasion to the government, reducing the risk that
convictions will be based on factual error, and impressing upon the trier
of fact the importance of achieving a state of subjective certainty
regarding the facts. 140
The Confrontation Clause also protects the integrity of the adversary
process. As part of the Bill of Rights, the Confrontation Clause grants a
fundamental right to the accused, which may be used as a shield to protect
the accused from potential government abuses, or used as a sword to
133. Id.
134. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
135. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 230 (1975) (quoting Berger v. United
States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)).
136. Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 414–15 (1988).
137. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974).
138. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361–64 (1970).
139. Id. at 372 (Harlan, J., concurring).
140. Id. at 364 (quoting Norman Dorsen & Daniel A. Rezneck, In Re Gault and the
Future of Juvenile Law, FAM. L.Q., Dec. 1967, at 1, 26).
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expose error and untruth.141 Confrontation and cross-examination are
“important where the evidence consists of the testimony of individuals
whose memory might be faulty or who, in fact, might be perjurers or
persons motivated by malice, vindictiveness, intolerance, prejudice, or
jealousy.”142 Used as a weapon, cross-examination can expose a witness’s
prejudice, bias, or ulterior motivation to lie;143 expose falsehoods;144 test a
witness’s ability to perceive and to remember; impeach;145 or “probe and
expose . . . [infirmities], thereby calling to the attention of the factfinder
the reasons for giving scant weight to the witness’ testimony.”146 Crossexamination thus “minimizes the risk that a judgment will be predicated
on incomplete, misleading, or even deliberately fabricated testimony.”147
A “jury’s estimate of the truthfulness and reliability of a given witness
may well be determinative of guilt or innocence, and it is upon such subtle
factors as the possible interest of the witness in testifying falsely that a
defendant’s life or liberty may depend.”148 Moreover, the right of
confrontation acts as a shield that “prevent[s] [constitutionally] improper
restrictions on the types of questions that defense counsel may ask
during cross-examination.”149
However, the rights under the Confrontation Clause may be forfeited,
waived, or limited by the trial court, just as with any other constitutional
right.150 The privilege may be lost by consent, by an express or implied
waiver, by conduct, or by misconduct.151 Additionally, “the ‘necessities
of trial and the adversary process’ [may] limit the manner in which Sixth
Amendment rights may be exercised, and limit the scope of Sixth
Amendment guarantees.”152 For example, the right to confront witnesses
is not the right to confront them in a way that disrupts the trial,153 and the
right to assistance of counsel does not include the right to consult with

141. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965).
142. Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496 (1959).
143. See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974).
144. See Pointer, 380 U.S. at 404.
145. See Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 19 (1985).
146. Id. at 22.
147. Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 411–12 (1988).
148. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959).
149. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 52 (1987).
150. See Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 936 (1991) (“The most basic rights
of criminal defendants are . . . subject to waiver.”).
151. See Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 450 (1912) (“[T]he right of
confrontation . . . is in the nature of a privilege extended to the accused . . . and that he is
free to assert it or to waive it . . . .” (citation omitted)); id. at 452 (“The view that this
right may be waived also was recognized by this court in Reynolds v. United
States . . . .”).
152. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 863 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
153. Id. at 864.
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counsel at all times during the trial.154 Additionally, an accused does not
have an unrestrained right to offer testimony that is untrue, incomplete,
privileged, or otherwise inadmissible.155 Like the prosecution, the
accused must comply with rules of procedure and evidence.156
Moreover, “the Confrontation Clause [only] guarantees ‘an opportunity
for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective
in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.’”157 In
fact, because the Clause has nothing to do with discovery in criminal
trials, the fact that some information was not disclosed which would
have made cross-examination more effective is not a violation of that
right.158 Thus, reasonable limitations by a trial judge on the bounds of
cross-examination are not violations of the Sixth Amendment.159 A trial
judge may properly limit cross-examination because of concerns about
“harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness’ safety, or
interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.”160 The
appropriate extent and scope of cross-examination within constitutional
limits are open questions.161
In addition to limitations made by a trial court, the right is also subject
to exceptions such as recognized hearsay exceptions. The exact number
of these exceptions has not been delineated, and, in fact, may be
enlarged.162 The danger inherent in hearsay statements is that they may
154. Id.
155. See Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 410 (1988); United States v. Nobles, 422
U.S. 225, 241 (1975).
156. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973).
157. Delaware v. Fensterer, 477 U.S. 15, 20 (1985) (per curiam).
158. Failure to disclose information that might have made cross-examination more
effective does not undermine the purpose of the Confrontation Clause. Indeed, the
Confrontation Clause has nothing to say about discovery. See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie,
480 U.S. 39, 52–53 (1987). “The ability to question adverse witnesses, however, does
not include the power to require the pretrial disclosure of any and all information that
might be useful in contradicting unfavorable testimony.” Id. at 53 (footnote omitted).
159. See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986); id. at 685 (White, J.,
concurring).
160. Id. at 679.
161. See Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1016 (1988).
[M]ost of this Court’s encounters with the Confrontation Clause have involved
either the admissibility of out-of-court statements . . . or restrictions on the
scope of cross-examination . . . . The reason for that is not . . . that these
elements are the essence of the Clause’s protection—but rather, quite the
contrary, that there is at least some room for doubt . . . as to the extent to which
the Clause includes those elements . . . .
Id. (citations omitted).
162. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 107 (1934) (“The exceptions are not . . .
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have been made under circumstances subject to none of the protections
afforded by the Sixth Amendment, such as cross-examination, oath, or
facial confrontation, and may thus be unreliable. Hearsay rules were
developed with a view that the probability of truth is favored in certain
extrajudicial statements because of the circumstances under which they
were uttered.163 The reasons for favoring its truthfulness vary, and may
include common sense notions, such as that people tend to tell the truth
when dying164 or when testifying under oath.165
Because the fundamental aim of the Clause is to promote the integrity
of the fact-finding process, exceptions under the hearsay rules, when
they are firmly rooted and have sufficient indicia of reliability, do not
violate that right.166 Such hearsay exceptions include, among others,
spontaneous declarations,167 statements made in the course of medical
treatment,168 prior testimony,169 a co-conspirator’s statement,170 and
dying declarations.171 As stated earlier, the test for admissibility is
whether there are substantial guarantees of the trustworthiness of the
statement and of the credibility of the declarant which overcome the
hearsay status of the evidence.172 The hearsay nature of the statements
involves the fact that they were made while the declarant was not under
oath, outside the courtroom, and not before the trier of fact who, thus,
could not observe the person’s demeanor at the time the statement was
uttered.173
Two examples of firmly-rooted hearsay exceptions will demonstrate
static, but may be enlarged from time to time if there is no material departure from the
reason of the general rule.”).
163. See Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594 (1994); Idaho v. Wright, 497
U.S. 805, 813–16 (1990); Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65–66 (1980); Dutton v. Evans,
400 U.S. 74, 88 (1970); United States v. White, 116 F.3d 903, 912 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
164. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1242 (West 1995 & Supp. 2002) (dying declarations).
165. See CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1290–1294 (West 1995 & Supp. 2002) (prior
testimony).
166. See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 355 & n.8 (1992). “We note first that the
evidentiary rationale for permitting hearsay testimony regarding spontaneous
declarations and statements made in the course of receiving medical care is that such outof-court declarations are made in contexts that provide substantial guarantees of their
trustworthiness.” Id. at 358 (footnote omitted). “‘[F]irmly rooted’ exceptions carry
sufficient indicia of reliability to satisfy the reliability requirement posed by the
Confrontation Clause.” Id. at 355 n.8.
167. See id. at 355–56.
168. See id.
169. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 165 (1970).
170. See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 79, 81 (1970); United States v. Inadi, 475
U.S. 387, 400 (1986).
171. See Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 151 (1892).
172. See White, 502 U.S. at 355 & n.8.
173. See Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594 (1994); Idaho v. Wright, 497
U.S. 805, 813–16 (1990); Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65–66 (1980); Dutton v. Evans,
400 U.S. 74, 88 (1970); United States v. White, 116 F.3d 903, 912 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
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why certain statements are inherently reliable. The rationale for permitting
hearsay testimony regarding statements made while receiving medical
care, is that “such out-of-court declarations are made in contexts that
provide substantial guarantees of their trustworthiness.”174 In this case,
“the declarant knows that a false statement may cause misdiagnosis or
mistreatment,”175 and it is unlikely that an individual would tell a lie
under such circumstances. Likewise, spontaneous declarations,176 statements
made while the declarant is excited or under stress, are considered reliable
since it is assumed that the declaration was made without the opportunity
to reflect or contrive.177 The very circumstances under which the statement
was uttered are its imprimatur of veracity. Thus, in these circumstances,
further scrutiny would be superfluous and adversary testing would add
little or nothing to the statement’s reliability.178 Further, even those
extrajudicial statements that do not come within a firmly-rooted exception,
and thus, presumptively do not have indicia of reliability for purposes of
the Confrontation Clause, may nonetheless meet those criteria if supported
by a sufficient showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.179
As shown, the right to confrontation is not absolute and may give way
to other important considerations or interests.180 In addition to the
exceptions already noted, limitation by the trial judge and hearsay rule
exceptions, the right may give way to considerations of public policy or
the necessities of the case. Before such considerations are explored,
however, the subject of witness intimidation, both its nature and impact,
must be addressed.
174. White, 502 U.S. at 355.
[S]tatements made by the victim to medical personnel for the purposes of
medical diagnosis or treatment including descriptions of the cause of symptom,
pain or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external
source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment shall be
admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule.
Id. at 351 n.2; see also CAL. EVID. CODE § 1250 (West 1995 & Supp. 2002).
175. White, 502 U.S. at 356.
176. California Evidence Code section 1240 provides: “Evidence of a statement is
not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the statement: (a) Purports to narrate,
describe, or explain an act, condition or event perceived by the declarant; and (b) Was
made spontaneously while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by
such perception.” CAL. EVID. CODE § 1240 (West 1995 & Supp. 2002).
177. See White, 502 U.S. at 356.
178. See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 820–21 (1990).
179. See id. at 817.
180. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1020 (1988); Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64
(1980); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973); Mattox v. United States, 156
U.S. 237, 243 (1895).
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IV. WITNESS INTIMIDATION
A. The Nature of Witness Intimidation
1. Introduction
Witness intimidation has a profound and serious impact on the ability
of government to enforce its laws and on society’s confidence in the
ability of government to protect its citizens. By depriving crime
investigators and prosecutors of critical evidence, witness intimidation
undermines the criminal justice system’s ability to protect its citizens
and ultimately undermines the confidence citizens have in their
government.181 Courts have acknowledged “the serious nature and
magnitude of the problem of witness intimidation,” and that government
must provide protection to its witnesses.182 Because the most important
factor in determining whether a case will be solved is the information
supplied by the victim to the police, failure to address witness
intimidation will lead to the loss of crucial evidence needed by
investigators.183 The California State Legislature has recognized the
important and integral part that crime witnesses play in the criminal
justice system:
In recognition of the civil and moral duty of victims and witnesses of crime
to fully and voluntarily cooperate with law enforcement and prosecutorial
agencies, and in further recognition of the continuing importance of this citizen
cooperation to state and local law enforcement efforts and the general
effectiveness and well-being of the criminal justice system of this state, the
Legislature declares its intent, in the enactment of this title, to ensure that all
victims and witnesses of crime are treated with dignity, respect, courtesy, and
sensitivity. It is the further intent that the rights enumerated in Section 679.02
relating to victims and witnesses of crime are honored and protected by law
enforcement agencies, prosecutors, and judges in a manner no less vigorous
than the protections afforded criminal defendants.184

Witness intimidation may frighten eyewitnesses to a crime to the
point that they will not come forward and provide crucial evidence to
the police and investigators. Or, witnesses may be so terrified
because of intimidation that they refuse to testify. Or, witness
intimidation may result in the disappearance or elimination of a
witness to prevent him or her from testifying at a defendant’s trial. In
each instance, the criminal justice system, society, and public safety
181. PETER FINN & KERRY MURPHY HEALEY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PREVENTING
GANG- AND DRUG-RELATED WITNESS INTIMIDATION 1 (1996).
182. Alvarado v. Superior Court, 5 P.3d 203, 222 (Cal. 2000).
183. JULIE ESSELMAN TOMZ & DANIEL MCGILLIS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SERVING
CRIME VICTIMS AND WITNESSES 2 (2d ed. 1997).
184. CAL. PENAL CODE § 679 (West 1999).
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suffer.185 Each situation prevents the prosecution of crimes, allows
those who are guilty of crimes to remain free and go unpunished, and
frustrates law enforcement personnel and prosecutors.186 Finally,
instances of witness intimidation create the perception that the law
cannot protect its citizens and thereby undermines public confidence in
the police and government.187 If individuals believe that they cannot be
adequately protected, they are less likely to cooperate with the police,
which in turn impedes the ability of the police to gather evidence in
attempt to stop criminal behavior. Thus, the cycle is vicious and
invidious.
Even though the United States Department of Justice has conducted
surveys about witness intimidation, the results of which indicate that it is
increasing and widespread, the Department acknowledged that the exact
extent of intimidation is unknown.188 Before discussing these surveys,
the nature of witness intimidation, both community intimidation and
direct intimidation, will be addressed.
2.

Community Intimidation

Community intimidation exists in neighborhoods with criminal street
gangs. Attempts by gangs or drug dealers to promote community-wide
noncooperation may include the public humiliation, assault, or even
execution of victims or witnesses, or members of their families, as well
as public acts of extreme brutality that are meant to terrify potential
witnesses. Even though there may not be an express threat of harm
addressed to any particular individual, intimidation felt by the
neighborhood inhabitants is just as real.189 Those who live in the area
know that certain identified gangs claim the area as their “turf.”190 The
residents have seen criminal acts and witnessed acts of retaliation
sufficient for them to believe that the same sort of harm would come to
them if any statements were given to law enforcement concerning any
witnessed criminal activity.191 Community intimidation is characterized
185. See People v. Weidert, 705 P.2d 380, 394 (Cal. 1985) (Lucas, J., concurring
and dissenting).
186. See FINN & HEALEY, supra note 181, at vii.
187. See id. at 2.
188. Id. at 4.
189. See id. at xi, 2, 5.
190. See People v. Gardeley, 927 P.2d 713, 718 (Cal. 1996); People ex rel. Gallo v.
Acuna, 929 P.2d 596, 601 (Cal. 1997).
191. See Acuna, 929 P.2d at 601–02, 613–14.
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by an atmosphere of fear and noncooperation with the police. It is
generated by a history of community members witnessing incidents of
gang violence, crimes, and retaliation against cooperating witnesses.192
Each instance of witness intimidation by gang violence or threat of
violence reinforces the perception that cooperation with the criminal
justice system is dangerous.193
Because penalties for witness tampering, suborning perjury, and
obstruction of justice are slight in comparison to penalties for violent
crimes such as murder, defendants accused of serious violent crimes
may feel that they have little to lose and much to gain from witness
intimidation.194 Gang members use intimidation and violence to subdue
any perceived challenge to their authority. Disputes or arguments with
those outside the gang are settled through the use of violence, even
murder. Others in the neighborhood are terrorized by the threat of such
retaliation, and this fear allows the gangs to continue their criminal
activity.195 Often, the police and prosecutors must resort to relying on
incarcerated witnesses or other felons for testimony in gang cases.196
Even when gang members are placed behind bars, neighborhood citizens
feel no relief from community intimidation. The threat of retaliation
from gang members who return after serving only brief sentences or who
arrange for others to get to or threaten them remains.197 Because it is
well-known that incarcerated gang members maintain uninterrupted
communication with gang members outside of prison, the threat of
retaliation against witnesses continues despite a defendant’s imprisonment
pending trial, or even after conviction.198
A good example of community intimidation by a gang is set forth in
People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna.199 The community was Rocksprings in
San Jose, California, and the court described the situation as follows:
The 48 declarations submitted by the City in support of its plea for
injunctive relief paint a graphic portrait of life in the community of
Rocksprings. Rocksprings is an urban war zone. The four-square-block
neighborhood, claimed as the turf of a gang variously known as Varrio Sureño
Town, Varrio Sureño Treces (VST), or Varrio Sureño Locos (VSL), is an
occupied territory. Gang members, all of whom live elsewhere, congregate on
lawns, on sidewalks, and in front of apartment complexes at all hours of the day
and night. They display a casual contempt for notions of law, order, and
decency—openly drinking, smoking dope, sniffing toluene, and even snorting
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
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cocaine laid out in neat lines on the hoods of residents’ cars. The people who
live in Rocksprings are subjected to loud talk, loud music, vulgarity, profanity,
brutality, fistfights and the sound of gunfire echoing in the streets. Gang
members take over sidewalks, driveways, carports, apartment parking areas, and
impede traffic on the public thoroughfares to conduct their drive-up drug
bazaar. Murder, attempted murder, drive-by shootings, assault and battery,
vandalism, arson, and theft are commonplace. The community has become a
staging area for gang-related violence and a dumping ground for the weapons
and instrumentalities of crime once the deed is done. Area residents have had
their garages used as urinals; their homes commandeered as escape routes; their
walls, fences, garage doors, sidewalks, and even their vehicles turned into a
sullen canvas of gang graffiti.
The people of this community are prisoners in their own homes. Violence
and the threat of violence are constant. Residents remain indoors, especially at
night. They do not allow their children to play outside. Strangers wearing the
wrong color clothing are at risk. Relatives and friends refuse to visit. The laundry
rooms, the trash dumpsters, the residents’ vehicles, and their parking spaces are
used to deal and stash drugs. Verbal harassment, physical intimidation, threats of
retaliation, and retaliation are the likely fate of anyone who complains of the
gang’s illegal activities or tells police where drugs may be hidden.200

Recognition of this dire situation is also reflected in the enactment of a
California statute called the “STEP Act,” a euphemism for the California
Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act, passed in 1988.201 The
preamble provides:
The Legislature, however, further finds that the State of California is in a state
of crisis which has been caused by violent street gangs whose members threaten,
terrorize, and commit a multitude of crimes against the peaceful citizens of their
neighborhoods. These activities, both individually and collectively, present a
clear and present danger to public order and safety and are not constitutionally
protected. The Legislature finds that there are nearly 600 criminal street gangs
operating in California, and that the number of gang-related murders is increasing.
The Legislature also finds that in Los Angeles County alone there were 328 gangrelated murders in 1986, and that gang homicides in 1987 have increased 80
percent over 1986. It is the intent of the Legislature in enacting this chapter to
seek the eradication of criminal activity by street gangs by focusing upon patterns
of criminal gang activity and upon the organized nature of street gangs, which
together, are the chief source of terror created by street gangs. The Legislature
further finds that an effective means of punishing and deterring the criminal
activities of street gangs is through forfeiture of the profits, proceeds, and
instrumentalities acquired, accumulated, or used by street gangs.202

The sad fact is that a community’s perception that the criminal justice
system cannot protect its citizens destroys the ability of police and

200.
201.
202.

Id. at 601–02.
CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 186.20–186.28 (West 1999 & Supp. 2002).
CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.21 (West 1999 & Supp. 2002).
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prosecutors to do their job as effectively as any specific threat.203
3.

Direct Intimidation

In addition to community intimidation, the criminal defendant may
directly intimidate a witness. Direct intimidation involves a threat
communicated in some manner to a witness, or an actual physical assault
on the witness. The threat is communicated either by the defendant, or
those close to him, either at his direction or with his consent, and is
intended to cause the witness not to testify or to change his or her
testimony to benefit the defendant. Any physical assault is intended to
have the same effect on the witness.204
Such intimidation can take many forms, such as physical violence or
threats of physical violence against the witness or a member of the
witness’s family.205 Particularly effective are threats of physical
violence against a witness’s mother, children, or spouse. Threats may be
communicated by drive-by shootings into the witness’s home, fire
bombings of cars, house burnings, or any other form of violent activity.
Intimidation may also involve explicit threats of murder.206
In 1994, then-assistant U.S. district attorney for the District of
Columbia expressed what he believed to be the reasons for the increase
in witness intimidation:
In my view the reasons for this dramatic increase in fear and intimidation
are many and varied. The defendants we prosecute for committing violent
crime are not only much younger than in the past, but they very often display
several commonly held attitudes and beliefs, including a profound lack of
respect for authority[;] the expectation that their own lives will be brief or will
be lived out in prison[;] a sense of powerlessness and social inadequacy that can
lead to the formation of gangs or neighborhood crews[;] the ready availability of
very powerful firearms[;] a willingness to use those firearms for almost no
reason or in retaliation for the most minimal slight to their extraordinarily
fragile egos[;] and lastly, and ironically, the increased penalties being imposed
on those convicted of violent crime, which can raise the stakes of a
prosecution.207

Intimidation may occur inside the courtroom or outside the
courthouse.208 It may involve the defendant, his relatives, or his
associates. Inside the courtroom, for example, the defendant’s friends
or relatives may stare or gesture at a witness in a threatening manner
203. FINN & HEALEY, supra note 181, at 2.
204. See id. at 1–10; NEXT MILLENIUM, supra note 15, at 1 (stating that “[w]itnesses
are being intimidated and threatened by gang members to keep them from testifying”).
205. FINN & HEALEY, supra note 181, at 5–7.
206. See id. at 1–2.
207. Id. at 6.
208. See, e.g., People v. Lybrand, 171 Cal. Rptr. 157, 162 (Ct. App. 1981).
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while the witness is in the courthouse or courtroom. Another particularly
effective form of intimidation occurs when gang members pack the
courtroom to demonstrate their solidarity with the defendant. These
gang members often wear black to symbolize death, stare at the witness
intently, or use threatening hand signals.209 Defendants also manipulate
the penal system to procure the intimidation of witnesses. Defendants
have access to information obtained by their defense attorneys from
prosecutors during discovery. In some jurisdictions where prisoners have
unmonitored phone use and unscreened correspondence, defendants can
use this information to arrange witness intimidation by those outside of
prison. Some gangs have even hired defense attorneys for witnesses in
custody for related or unrelated crimes without the witnesses’
knowledge or consent in an effort to control their testimony.210 Other
examples of intimidation in courtroom settings have been memorialized
in published cases.
In one case, as the witness stepped down from the stand after
testifying, the defendant made a throat slitting gesture directed at the
witness. The witness burst out, “What the hell did that mean? He’s over
there going like this—excuse me, your Honor.” The trial judge
permitted the witness to retake the witness stand and testify and describe
to the jury what had occurred. On appeal, the court found that the trial
judge did not err, because the evidence was admissible and relevant as to
the defendant’s consciousness of guilt.211
An infamous case of courtroom intimidation involved Charles Manson
and his followers, Patricia Krenwinkel and Susan Atkins.212 Linda
Kasabian, another devotee of Manson’s, had been charged as well, but
was granted immunity and testified as a witness for the prosecution.213
As she testified, Manson stared at her, and “took his right index finger
from right to left and made a motion across the bottom [of] his chin from
right to left,”214 simulating the slitting of a throat.215
Courtroom intimidation may also involve friends or relatives of the
defendant. The victim in a sex case had been warned by the defendant
209. FINN & HEALEY, supra note 181, at 7.
210. Id.
211. People v. Foster, 246 Cal. Rptr. 855, 857 (Ct. App. 1988).
212. See People v. Manson, 132 Cal. Rptr. 265, 276–77 (Ct. App. 1976).
213. Id. at 281.
214. Id. at 296 (alteration in original) (quoting Sergeant Gutierrez of the Los
Angeles Police Department, who observed Manson’s threatening behavior at the trial).
215. Id. at 296 n.40.
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that she should never tell the police what happened because “he had a lot
of bad friends.”216 As she was about to leave the courthouse after the
preliminary hearing, she saw three men who had been in the courtroom
at the time of her testimony leaning against the hood of her parked car.
One man was the defendant’s father and one was his brother. She had
also received threatening telephone calls from a man who identified
himself as a friend of the defendant warning her not to testify.217
In another case, three different witnesses gave statements to the police
and identified the defendant, who was on trial for murder, as the
individual who shot the victim. By the time of the trial, however, all
three witnesses were reluctant to testify.218 Each of the witnesses either
recanted their prior statements to the police, claimed loss of memory, or
claimed that their earlier statements were tainted either by use of drugs,
alcohol, or for some other reason. Each had been threatened by the
defendant’s brother prior to trial.219
In yet another case, a witness was reluctant to testify and hid his face
while he testified. He was afraid because the defendant’s aunt had
followed him from the courtroom on one occasion, and the witness’s
brother, who was in custody, was assaulted by the defendant when they
were both in jail two days after the witness’s earlier testimony.220
Witness intimidation is often the reason why a witness’s testimony at
trial is contrary or contradictory to that witness’s earlier statements to
the police.221 Three teenage witnesses in one case testified at the
defendant’s preliminary hearing. During each of the three witnesses’
testimony, the defendant’s brother sat in the courtroom and glared at the
witness.222 At the time of jury trial, all three witnesses recanted their
earlier testimony, and denied each piece of information and each
statement they had given to the police.223 Even though all of the
witnesses denied being threatened, the trial court noted that their
demeanor during their testimony evidenced otherwise.224
Witness intimidation and murder have also led federal trial courts to
impanel anonymous jurors. Vittorio Amuso, the reputed head of the
Luchese crime family, was tried in 1992 for fourteen murders, tax fraud,
and other crimes.225 Before trial, the prosecution presented evidence that
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
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Amuso had made prior attempts to interfere with witnesses and that
Amuso, being the head of a powerful and violent crime organization,
“had the means to engage in jury tampering.”226 The trial court granted
the prosecutor’s request for an anonymous and sequestered jury.227
Evidence during the trial showed that Amuso had the exclusive and
ultimate authority to order murders on behalf of the crime family. Two
former captains of the Luchese family turned government witnesses and
testified for the prosecution during the trial.228 They testified about
fourteen murders committed over a two-year period, which were ordered
by the defendant to eradicate disloyalty within the family. Contracts
were ordered against the two government witnesses prior to their
testimony, and one was shot twelve times, but survived and testified.229
The defendant was ultimately convicted of fifty-four counts of
racketeering, extortion, fraud, bribery, and multiple murders.230
In another case involving organized crime, the defendant, Nicodemo
Scarfo, was the boss of the Philadelphia La Cosa Nostra.231 The
defendant had conspired with a councilman and his administrative aide
to extort $1,000,000 from a real estate developer in exchange for the
councilman’s cooperation in the redevelopment project on the
waterfront. The real estate developer contacted the FBI and reported the
extortion plan. Unbeknownst to the crime family, the FBI had already
infiltrated the organization. The case went to trial based on evidence
obtained from the FBI and from two members of Scarfo’s organization,
who agreed to testify as government witnesses. This permitted the
government to present virtually conclusive proof of the extortion
scheme. However, before trial, one prospective witness and one judge
were murdered, and attempts had been made to bribe other judges. The
two government witnesses, one a former “capo” in the defendant’s
group, testified to these facts. Both government witnesses were
threatened and relocated after trial.232
In another case, defendants, members of an infamous Asian gang
known as “Born to Kill,”233 were charged with multiple counts,
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

Id. at 1264.
Id.
Id. at 1254.
Id. at 1254, 1257.
Id. at 1253.
United States v. Scarfo, 850 F.2d 1015, 1017 (3d Cir. 1988).
Id. at 1017–20.
United States v. Thai, 29 F.3d 785, 794–95 (2d Cir. 1994).
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including murder, robbery, and extortion.234 One robbery victim
identified several of the gang members at a line-up as the ones who
robbed his jewelry store. After several attempts of intimidating the
witness to keep him from testifying against them at trial, they murdered
him with a close-up gunshot to his head.235 In other Born to Kill
robberies, the robbers pointed and cocked their guns at the victims just
prior to leaving.236
Another Asian gang that specialized in extortion was the Green
Dragon Gang.237 Members of the gang committed robberies and
extorted “protection money” from Chinese-run businesses. To protect
their enterprise, the gang members often engaged in violence, murdering
witnesses who identified them and victims who refused to pay the
extortion money.238 In support of a motion to impanel an anonymous
jury, the prosecution presented evidence of the gang’s extensive history
of interfering with the judicial process, including the murders of
witnesses in retaliation for testifying and attempted murders of witnesses
to prevent them from testifying. The trial court granted the motion for
an anonymous jury.239
In yet another case, seven members of the Mexican Mafia (EME)
were charged with a continuing enterprise of murder, drug distribution
and firearm offenses. The gang had a written constitution, which
included in the preamble the following statement: “Being a criminal
organization . . .[w]e shall deal in drugs, contract killings, prostitution,
large scale robbery [etc.].”240 One of the group’s tenets was to interfere
with potential witnesses and to murder or attempt to murder members
suspected of becoming informants.241
Intimidation also occurs inside prison walls where incarcerated
inmates are particularly vulnerable. Because their movements are
restricted, inmates are easy prey to other inmates.242 Prison inmate
murders among notorious prison gangs are not unusual. Taking out a
prospective witness may be part of a gang initiation because some gangs,
like the Aryan Brotherhood and the Mexican Mafia, require that
prospective members kill as a condition of association.243 Prison gang
234.
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238.
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members are even able to plan and direct the murders of individuals
housed in separate penitentiaries.244
One prison case involved an inmate murder contracted by the Aryan
Brotherhood, a violent white supremacist prison gang.245 The case
describes how a contract was taken out on the victim because he had
cheated an Aryan Brotherhood commissioner in another penitentiary.
The cheated Aryan member successfully communicated the contract to a
member of the Brotherhood incarcerated in a different federal prison,
despite mail censorship and restrictions on inter-inmate correspondence.246
One government witness was so frightened that he slashed his wrists and
hanged himself in a phony suicide attempt, in order to be placed in the
Witness Protection Program.247
B. Witness Intimidation Statistics
Statistics reflect an increase in victim and witness intimidation. For
example, a 1990 study conducted in New York City showed that 36% of
victims and witnesses in criminal cases at the Bronx Criminal Court had
been threatened, and 57% who had not been threatened nevertheless
feared retaliation.248
In 1994, the United States Department of Justice conducted a survey
of 2350 state prosecutorial agencies that handle felony cases and staff at
least 65,000 individuals.
Those individuals included attorneys,
investigators, and support staff.249 Of the total number of offices
surveyed, 75% provided either security or assistance for victims or
witnesses in criminal cases who had been threatened.250 Approximately
half of the offices reported that a staff member received a threat or was
in fact assaulted.251 In fact, from 1992 to 1994, threats or assaults

States v. Santiago, 46 F.3d 885, 888 (9th Cir. 1995).
244. See Silverstein, 732 F.2d at 1341–43. Two of the inmates involved in the
murder in Silverstein were also involved in other prison murders. See id. at 1342–43; see
also United States v. Mills, 704 F.2d 1553, 1555 (11th Cir. 1983); United States v.
Fountain, 642 F.2d 1083, 1085–86 (7th Cir.1982).
245. See Mills, 704 F.2d at 1555.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 1560.
248. Healey, supra note 11, at 13 n.3.
249. CAROL J. DEFRANCES ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PROSECUTORS IN STATE
COURTS, 1994, at 1 (1996).
250. Id.
251. Id.

1203

FINALCASSANI2.DOC

2/4/2020 12:58 PM

against staff members increased from 28% to 51%.252 In 74% of the
offices, prosecutors failed to pursue a felony case to trial because of
victims’ fears of retaliation.253 Eighty-two percent of the larger
prosecutorial offices reported case dismissals because of the
unavailability of prosecution witnesses. Reluctance to testify, either
because of fear of retribution or because of actual threats to victims,
occurred in 92% of these offices, and to witnesses in 77% of the
offices.254 In over half of the offices, a staff member was the victim of
either a threat or an assault. This indicated a 100% increase from two
years earlier.255 Different types of security were employed to protect
those threatened, including personal police protection, transportation
under guard to and from court, or actual relocation of the threatened
individual.256
Another 1994 survey sampled 192 prosecutors and found that 51% of
prosecutors in large jurisdictions, counties with populations greater than
250,000, considered victim and witness intimidation a major problem.
This same survey found that in small jurisdictions, counties with
populations between 50,000 and 250,000, 43% of the prosecutors stated
that victim and witness intimidation was a major problem. Another 30%
of large jurisdictions and 25% of small jurisdictions considered
intimidation a moderately serious problem.257
In 1995, the Department of Justice reported that victim and witness
intimidation had been increasing over the past two decades. Prosecutors
estimated intimidation in 75% to 100% of cases that involved violent
crimes in gang areas.258
Neither those in charge of the Federal Witness Protection Program or
the California program keep statistics on the number of individuals who
leave the program and are threatened or assaulted. Nor are any statistics
kept on the number of individuals that leave the program and are
eventually killed.259
C. Witness Protection Programs
1. The Federal Program
In the late 1960s, the United States Department of Justice recognized
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
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that victim and witness intimidation had become a serious impediment to
obtaining testimony in organized crime cases.260 This concern was also
fueled by statistics that revealed that a staggering number of crimes were
never reported.261 In response, Congress enacted the Organized Crime
Control Act of 1970, which laid the basis for the Federal Witness
Protection Program.262
The Federal Witness Protection Program263 was authorized by the
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970.264 Originally, the program was
formulated to purchase and maintain housing facilities for protected
witnesses, but that approach was discarded.265 The legislative intent was
260. Healey, supra note 11, at 6.
261. TOMZ & MCGILLIS, supra note 183, at 2.
262. Healey, supra note 11, at 6.
263. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3521–3528 (2000).
264. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, §§ 501–504, 84
Stat. 922, 933–34 (1970). Title V authorizes the United States Attorney General to
protect and maintain federal or state organized crime witnesses and their families.
Sections 501 through 504 provide:
Sec. 501. The Attorney General of the United States is authorized to provide
for the security of Government witnesses, potential Government witnesses, and
the families of Government witnesses and potential witnesses in legal
proceedings against any person alleged to have participated in an organized
criminal activity.
Sec. 502. The Attorney General of the United States is authorized to rent,
purchase, modify, or remodel protected housing facilities and to otherwise
offer to provide for the health, safety, and welfare of witnesses and persons
intended to be called as Government witnesses, and the families of witnesses
and persons intended to be called as Government witnesses in legal
proceedings instituted against any person alleged to have participated in an
organized criminal activity whenever, in his judgment, testimony from, or a
willingness to testify by, such a witness would place his life or person, or the
life or person of a member of his family or household, in jeopardy. Any
person availing himself of an offer by the Attorney General to use such
facilities may continue to use such facilities for as long as the Attorney
General determines the jeopardy to his life or person continues.
Sec. 503. As used in this title, “Government” means the United States, any
State, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, any
territory or possession of the United States, any political subdivision, or any
department, agency, or instrumentality thereof. The offer of facilities to
witnesses may be conditioned by the Attorney General upon reimbursement in
whole or in part to the United States by any State or any political subdivision,
or any department, agency, or instrumentality thereof of the cost of
maintaining and protecting such witnesses.
Sec. 504. There is hereby authorized to be appropriated from time to time such
funds as are necessary to carry out the provisions of this title.
Id.
265. Franz v. United States, 707 F.2d 582, 586–87 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
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twofold: to create an incentive for persons involved in organized crime
to become informants266 and to recognize “a felt moral obligation to
repay citizens who risk life by carrying out their duty as citizens to
testify.”267 Again, as originally formulated, services were to be limited
to witnesses of organized crime,268 but in its current form, the program
provides protective services to witnesses and family members in cases
involving organized crime “or other serious offense, if the Attorney
General determines that an offense involving a crime of violence
directed at the witness . . . is likely to be committed.”269 Those services
may be provided as long as the danger to the protected individual
continues.270 The services provided to the protected individuals may
include physical protection, documents for a new identity, housing,
transportation, subsistence for living, assistance in obtaining
employment, and other services needed to make the individual selfsustaining.271 In return, the identity and location of the individual will
not be disclosed, unless law enforcement officials indicate the individual
is under a criminal felony investigation.272 Knowing, unauthorized
disclosure subjects a person to a fine of $5000 and/or imprisonment for
five years.273
Prior to admission into the program, an evaluation of the individual’s
suitability must be performed and the individual also must undergo a
psychological examination.274 In addition, the individual must execute a
memorandum of understanding that outlines his duties, obligations and
responsibilities—to testify in and provide information to law
enforcement concerning the criminal proceedings, to refrain from
committing any crime, to avoid detection and to cooperate with all
reasonable requests of those protecting the person.275 The Attorney
General may terminate protection if the protected person “substantially
breaches” the memorandum of understanding, or provides false
information.276 Physical protection for those who enter the program is
provided by the United States Marshal’s office.277
In November 1996, the House of Representatives held hearings on the
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
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Federal Witness Protection Program.278 From its inception in 1970 to
the date of the hearings, the program had provided protection and
assistance for more than 6600 witnesses and 8000 of their family
members. There is a rigorous review process for applicants, and all
adults who enter the program have psychological examinations.279 No
one that has followed the rules and guidelines has been killed. However,
there have been some who have not abided by the program’s conditions
and have lost their lives.280 No statistics are kept on the number of such
occurrences. Nor are statistics kept on the number of criminal cases
which were not prosecuted because witnesses refused to testify or
provide evidence due to intimidation.
One protected witness who violated the rules by giving interviews to
the press, revealing his new identity, and allowing himself to be
photographed was discharged from the program and unsuccessfully sued
claiming a violation of his constitutional rights.281 Another ultimately
unsuccessful claim against the government was for negligence when a
person protected by the program committed a murder.282 In another
case, a creditor claimed that the government committed an
unconstitutional taking of his property when he was unable to locate a
debtor protected by the program. The creditor’s claim was also
unsuccessful. 283
A series of lawsuits against the government involved the relocation of
children with their protected parent, without notification to the
noncustodial parent.284 In each of the cases, the affected parent lost all
contact with his or her children and could not find out their new
identities or new locations.285 One parent lost contact with his children

278. See Witness Protection Programs in America, Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1996).
279. Id. at 39–40 (statement of Stephen J. T’Kach, Associate Director, Office of
Enforcement Operations, Criminal Division, United States Department of Justice).
280. Id. at 40.
281. Garcia v. United States, 666 F.2d 960, 961–62 (5th Cir. 1982).
282. See Bergmann v. United States, 689 F.2d 789, 790, 797 (8th Cir. 1982).
283. Melo-Tone Vending, Inc. v. United States, 666 F.2d 687, 687, 689 (1st Cir.
1981).
284. See, e.g., Prisco v. United States, 851 F.2d 93 (3d Cir. 1988); Franz v. United
States, 707 F.2d 582 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Ruffalo v. Civiletti, 702 F.2d 710 (8th Cir. 1983);
Leonhard v. United States, 633 F.2d 599 (2d Cir. 1980); Leonhard v. Mitchell, 473 F.2d
709 (2d Cir. 1973).
285. Leonhard, 473 F.2d at 711; Leonhard, 633 F.2d at 604–05; Ruffalo, 702 F.2d
at 712–13; Prisco, 851 F.2d at 94; Franz, 707 F.2d at 589–90.
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for eight years.286 Each parent eventually had to file a lawsuit in order to
obtain relief. After the United States Supreme Court decided in
Santosky v. Kramer that natural parents are entitled to due process before
their rights in their children may be dissolved,287 courts have held that
noncustodial parents have a right to notice of and a hearing on the
relocation of their children as part of the Witness Protection Program.288
This right is based on the fundamental liberty interest parents have in the
care and management of their children’s lives.289 This principle is now
codified as 18 U.S.C. § 3524, which requires compliance with child
custody orders and notification to the affected parent.290
Despite the success of the federal Witness Protection Program, “[t]he
strict requirements for entry to the . . . program, the high cost of
providing lifelong services to witnesses and their families, and the
personal sacrifices involved in participating in the program have led a
number of prosecutors and police to seek [other alternatives].”291
2.

The California Witness Protection Program

In 1997, the State of California enacted its witness protection
program,292 administered by the attorney general. It provides for the
286. See Leonhard, 633 F.2d at 606.
287. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753–54 (1982).
288. See, e.g., Franz, 707 F.2d at 596, 608; Prisco, 851 F.2d at 97.
289. See Prisco, 851 F.2d at 97.
290. 18 U.S.C. § 3524(a)–(c) (2000).
291. Healey, supra note 11, at 5.
292. California Penal Code sections 14020 through 14033 provide:
§ 14020. Witness Protection Program
There is hereby established the Witness Protection Program.
§ 14021. Definitions
As used in this title:
(a) “Witness” means any person who has been summoned, or is
reasonably expected to be summoned, to testify in a criminal matter, including
grand jury proceedings, for the people whether or not formal legal proceedings
have been filed. Active or passive participation in the criminal matter does not
disqualify an individual from being a witness. “Witness” may also apply to
family, friends, or associates of the witness who are deemed by the Attorney
General to be endangered.
(b) “Credible evidence” means evidence leading a reasonable person to
believe that substantial reliability should be attached to the evidence.
(c) “Protection” means formal admission into a witness protection
program established by this title memorialized by a written agreement between
the Attorney General and the witness.
§ 14022. Administration of program; Attorney General
The program shall be administered by the Attorney General. In any
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criminal proceeding within this state, when the action is brought by local
prosecutors, where credible evidence exists of a substantial danger that a
witness may suffer intimidation or retaliatory violence, the Attorney General
may reimburse state and local agencies for the costs of providing witness
protection services.
§ 14023. Prioritization
The Attorney General shall give priority to matters involving organized
crime, gang activities, drug trafficking, and cases involving a high degree of
risk to the witness. Special regard shall also be given to the elderly, the young,
battered, victims of domestic violence, the infirm, the handicapped, and
victims of hate incidents.
§ 14024. Coordination of efforts between state and local agencies;
reimbursements
The Attorney General shall coordinate the efforts of state and local
agencies to secure witness protection services and then reimburse those state
and local agencies for the costs of the services that he or she determines to be
necessary to protect a witness from bodily injury and otherwise to assure the
health, safety, and welfare of the witness. The Attorney General may
reimburse the state or local agencies that provide witnesses with any of the
following:
(a) Armed protection or escort by law enforcement officials or security
personnel before, during, or subsequent to, legal proceedings.
(b) Physical relocation to an alternate residence.
(c) Housing expense.
(d) Appropriate documents to establish a new identity.
(e) Transportation or storage of personal possessions.
(f) Basic living expenses, including, but not limited to, food, transportation,
utility costs, and health care.
(g) Other services as needed and approved by the Attorney General.
§ 14025. Witness protection agreement; terms
The witness protection agreement shall be in writing, and shall specify the
responsibilities of the protected person that establish the conditions for the
Attorney General providing protection. The protected person shall agree to all
of the following:
(a) If a witness or potential witness, to testify in and provide information
to all appropriate law enforcement officials concerning all appropriate
proceedings.
(b) To refrain from committing any crime.
(c) To take all necessary steps to avoid detection by others of the facts
concerning the protection provided to that person under this title.
(d) To comply with legal obligations and civil judgments against that
person.
(e) To cooperate with all reasonable requests of officers and employees of
this state who are providing protection under this title.
(f) To designate another person to act as agent for the service of process.
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(g) To make a sworn statement of all outstanding legal obligations,
including obligations concerning child custody and visitation.
(h) To disclose any probation or parole responsibilities, and if the person
is on probation or parole.
(i) To regularly inform the appropriate program official of his or her
activities and current address.
§ 14025.5. Liability of Attorney General
The Attorney General shall not be liable for any condition in the witness
protection agreement that cannot reasonably be met due to a witness
committing a crime during participation in the program.
§ 14026. Funding; uses
Funds available to implement this title may be used for any of the
following:
(a) To protect witnesses where credible evidence exists that they may be
in substantial danger of intimidation or retaliatory violence because of their
testimony.
(b) To provide temporary and permanent relocation of witnesses and
provide for their transition and well-being into a safe and secure environment.
(c) To pay the costs of administering the program.
§ 14026.5. Witness deemed victim
For the purposes of this title, notwithstanding Article 1 (commencing with
Section 13959) of Chapter 5 of Part 4 of Division 3 of Title 2 of the
Government Code, a witness, as defined in subdivision (a) of Section 14021,
selected by the Attorney General to receive services under the program
established pursuant to this title because he or she has been or may be
victimized due to the testimony he or she will give, shall be deemed a victim.
§ 14027. Guidelines and regulations
The Attorney General shall issue appropriate guidelines and may adopt
regulations to implement this title. These guidelines shall include:
(a) A process whereby state and local agencies shall apply for
reimbursement of the costs of providing witness protection services.
(b) An appropriate level for the match that shall be made by local
agencies. The Attorney General may also establish a process through which to
waive the required local match when appropriate.
§ 14028. Immunity from civil liability
The State of California, the counties and cities within the state, and their
respective officers and employees shall have immunity from civil liability for
any decision declining or revoking protection to a witness under this title.
§ 14029. Confidentiality of witness information
All information relating to any witness participating in the program
established pursuant to this title shall remain confidential and is not subject to
disclosure pursuant to the California Public Records Act (Chapter 3.5
(commencing with Section 6250) of Division 7 of Title 1 of the Government
Code) and, if a change of name has been approved by the program, the order to
show cause is not subject to the publication requirement of Section 1277 of the
Code of Civil Procedure.
§ 14030. Legal process; liaison with United States Marshal
(a) The Attorney General shall establish a liaison with the United States
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protection and relocation of witnesses “where credible evidence exists
that they may be in substantial danger of intimidation or retaliatory
violence because of their testimony.”293 The reason for the enactment
was the legislature’s recognition that retaliation against witnesses has a
serious negative impact on the prosecution of crime.294 At one of the
Assembly Committee’s hearings, it was noted that
[a]ccording to a recent Los Angeles Times series, more than a thousand gang
killers are walking the streets of Los Angeles. More and more gang killers
responsible for about 40% of Los Angeles County’s murders remain free.
Witness intimidation helps keep them on the street. Witnesses have been killed
and many more threatened. Incidents of witness intimidation occur frequently

Marshal’s office in order to facilitate the legal processes over which the
federal government has sole authority, including, but not limited to, those
processes included in Section 14024. The liaison shall coordinate all
requests for federal assistance relating to witness protection as established by
this title.
(b) The Attorney General shall pursue all federal sources that may be
available for implementing this program. For that purpose, the Attorney
General shall establish a liaison with the United States Department of Justice.
(c) The Attorney General with the Board of Control shall establish
procedures to maximize federal funds for witness protection services.
§ 14031. Annual reports
Commencing one year after the effective date of this title, the Attorney
General shall make an annual report to the Legislature no later than January 1
on the fiscal and operational status of the program.
§ 14032. Administrative costs
The administrative costs of the Attorney General for the purposes of
administering this title shall be limited to 5 percent of all costs incurred
pursuant to this title.
§ 14033. Budget; appropriations
(a) The Governor’s budget shall specify the estimated amount in the
Restitution Fund that is in excess of the amount needed to pay claims pursuant
to Sections 13960 to 13965, inclusive, of the Government Code, to pay
administrative costs for increasing restitution funds, and to maintain a prudent
reserve.
(b) It is the intent of the Legislature that, notwithstanding Government
Code Section 13967, in the annual Budget Act, funds be appropriated to the
Attorney General from those funds that are in excess of the amount specified
pursuant to subdivision (a) for the purposes of this title.
CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 14020–14033 (West 2000 & Supp. 2002).
293. Id. § 14026(a).
294. Assembly Comm. Report on AB 856, 1997–98 Reg. Sess., at 3 (Cal. Apr. 22,
1997), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/97-98/bill/asm/ab_0851-0900/ab
856_cfa_19970421_073716_asm_comm.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2002).
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enough to frighten potential witnesses from cooperating with prosecutors. Gang
cases are the hardest to solve. 295

The assembly concluded that
[t]here is a compelling need for a statewide [witness protection program]. The
problems posed by witness intimidation in gang cases cannot be overstated.
Even in cases where there has been no direct intimidation, there is often a need
for relocation to secure the cooperation of witnesses who for good reason fear
that they and their families are at risk if they cooperate with law
enforcement.296

One of the articles in the series referenced by the assembly stated that
“[t]he witness protection problem is particularly severe in Los Angeles
County, where authorities say witness intimidation and killings have
helped fuel a cycle of violence in which more and more people are too
frightened to testify, allowing more killers to go free.”297 More recent
articles have recounted the ability of imprisoned defendants to arrange
contract killings. According to one article, because of the large volume
of telephone calls made by inmates, only a small percentage of them are
monitored. Some facilities, such as county jails, do not monitor calls at
all.298 Several news articles have featured stories about crime victims
who have been attacked, or antigang activists who have been killed.299
The California Department of Justice, through the Law Enforcement
Information Center, recorded 2966 felony and misdemeanor arrests for
witness intimidation from 1992 through 1997,300 and from 1995 to 1996,
thirty-eight persons were incarcerated for witness intimidation.301
295. Id. at 1.
296. Id. at 5.
297. Ted Rohrlich & Fredric N. Tulsky, Efforts to Protect Witnesses Fall Short in
L.A. County, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1996, at A1. Several other articles contain
information on witness intimidation. Accused Rapist Shoots Witness, Kills Himself, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 21, 2000, at A21; Michael Krikorian, Case of Teacher’s Shooting Dropped
After 2 Trials, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1997, at B3; Gina Piccalo & Kurt Streeter, Venice
Anti-Gang Activist Killed in His Driveway, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2000, at B1; George
Ramos, Witness Tells of His Life in Prison Gang, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 30, 1997, at B1;
Daniel Yi, Inmates Do More than Phone Home, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2001, at A1; see
also Alvarado v. Superior Court, 5 P.3d 203, 222 n.14 (Cal. 2000) (listing articles).
298. Yi, supra note 297 (noting that with the First Amendment as a shield and
monitoring spotty, prisoners make calls to arrange crimes that include murder).
299. Gunman Shoots 2, Kills Self in Court Hall, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Oct. 21,
2000, at News 4; Piccalo & Streeter, supra note 297; Prisoner Moved to Cut Alleged
Mob Ties, PRESS-TELEGRAM, Jan. 9, 2001, at A3.
300. Assembly Comm. Report on AB 856, 1997–98 Reg. Sess., at 2 (Cal. Apr. 22,
1997), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/97-98/bill/asm/ab_0851-0900/ab
856_cfa_19970421_073716_asm_comm.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2002).
301. Assembly Comm. Report on AB 856, 1997–98 Reg. Sess., at 2 (Cal. May 21,
1997), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/97-98/bill/asm/ab_0851-0900/ab
856_cfa_19970421_073716_asm_comm.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2002); see CAL.
PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(10) (West 2002) (prescribing either the death penalty or life
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According to the Los Angeles County District Attorney, from 1995 to
2000, twenty-five cases were filed that alleged the special circumstance
of murdering a witness to a crime to prevent that person from testifying
or in retaliation for testifying. Moreover, during that period, the Los
Angeles County District Attorney reported that 1600 cases of witness
intimidation were being investigated and that in over 1000 gang murder
cases, witnesses refused to cooperate.302
The California witness protection program authorizes the attorney
general to administer the program and to reimburse state and local
agencies for the costs of providing witness protection services.303 Unlike
the federal program, which has its own enforcement agency, the state
must rely on local enforcement departments to provide whatever
services they decide are appropriate and necessary.304 Those services
include armed protection and armed escort before, during, and after legal
proceedings; physical relocation; housing expenses; a new identity;
transportation; subsistence allowance; and other services as needed.305
The protection is limited to a period of six months. If additional
protection is warranted, however, an extension may be granted.306
Again, this differs from the federal program, which has no time
limitation for its services. Furthermore, the period of protection is
relatively short, because the majority of murder cases last one year or
more from the time of commission of the crime until a verdict is
rendered.
Like the federal program, the witnesses protected under the California
program must enter into a written agreement that specifies the
responsibilities of the protected person, including the obligation to
testify and provide information concerning the subject proceedings, to
take steps to avoid detection, to cooperate with reasonable requests, and
to continually inform program officials of his or her activities and
current address.307 Priority for acceptance into the program is given to
imprisonment as punishment for killing a witness in order to prevent that witness from
testifying in a criminal proceeding).
302. See Alvarado v. Superior Court, 5 P.3d 203, 222 n.14 (Cal. 2000).
303. CAL. PENAL CODE § 14022 (West 2002).
304. See id. § 14024.
305. Id. § 14024(a)–(g).
306. CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, POLICY AND PROCEDURES MANUAL FOR LOCAL AND
STATE PROSECUTING AGENCIES 9 (2000).
307. CAL. PENAL CODE § 14025 (West 2002). A copy of the witness protection
agreement is in the Appendix to this Article.
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witnesses involved in matters related to organized crime, criminal street
gangs, drug trafficking, and other cases involving a high degree of
risk.308
All information about witnesses in the program is confidential and not
subject to disclosure.309 This raises the question of whether defense
counsel is prevented from inquiring of a protected witness’s true name,
new identity, or current address when the witness testifies at trial. Most
likely, this issue will arise in a future proceeding. In federal court, trial
judges have allowed witnesses in the program to testify without
revealing their new identity when a sufficient showing of danger to the
witness has been presented to the court,310 and have restricted questions
on cross-examination about the protection program.311 Questions about
payments and other government support have been allowed, but
information about the protection itself has not.312
Since its inception, the program has received an annual funding of
three million dollars.313 In its initial year of operation, January 1, 1998
through December 31, 1998, the program opened 125 cases for 154
witnesses, which involved 275 defendants, and also provided protection
for 207 family members.314 Costs totaled almost three quarters of a
million dollars.315 Of these cases, 77% (ninety-six cases) were gangrelated, 4% (five cases) involved drug trafficking, 15% (nineteen cases)
were high-risk offenses, and 4% (five cases) involved domestic
violence.316 Overall, 96% were crimes of violence, with almost 70%
involving murder or attempted murder.317
The second year of operation, January 1, 1999 through December 31,
1999, saw an increase of over 200% in the number of new cases.318 The
program opened 379 new cases, which involved 456 witnesses, 665
defendants, and also provided protection for 665 relatives.319 It is
amazing to note that in the first two years of its operation, the program
had already served 10% of the total number of people protected in the
Federal Witness Protection Program during its twenty-six years of
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.

Id. § 14023.
Id. § 14029.
See United States v. Watson, 599 F.2d 1149, 1157 (2d Cir. 1979).
See United States v. Tarantino, 846 F.2d 1384, 1407 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
See id.
CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S ANNUAL REPORT
CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE 4 (2000).
314. CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S ANNUAL REPORT
CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE 5 (1999).
315. Id.
316. Id. at 6.
317. Id. at 7.
318. CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 313, at 1.
319. Id. at 5.
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operation. Of the cases opened in its second year, 71% (272 cases) were
gang-related, 5% (nineteen cases) involved drug trafficking, 18% (sixtyeight cases) were high-risk crimes, 1% (two cases) were organized
crime, and 5% (eighteen cases) involved domestic violence.320 Of the
total number of cases, 95% were crimes of violence, with 65% involving
murder or attempted murder.321 Total funds encumbered to date were
approximately two and one-half million dollars.322 These figures provide
circumstantial evidence of the growth and spread of witness
intimidation. Initially, twenty-five counties participated in the program
during the first year of operation, but the number grew to thirty-five
counties in its second year of operation.323
Unlike the federal program, no litigation has been filed under the
California program, most likely because it is new. To avoid liability for
the safety or misconduct of witnesses participating in witness protection
programs, program administrators are advised not to make promises to
the witnesses unless the promises can be kept and are approved by those
with the authority to comply with such promises.324 Prior case law will
most likely be relied on for the standard of care to be exercised by those
who protect the witnesses and family members who enter the program.
Because there is no one enforcement agency in charge of protecting the
witnesses, the standardization of care and treatment will necessarily be
diverse.
In one case, Carpenter v. City of Los Angeles, a robbery victim was
shot after he testified at a defendant’s preliminary hearing.325 Carpenter
sued the City of Los Angeles for the damages he suffered as a result of
the shooting, and when he lost at trial, he asked the court of appeal to
determine whether the city and its police department owe a duty to their
witnesses in criminal cases, to warn them of threats to their lives.326
After Carpenter testified at defendant Jenkins’s preliminary hearing,
Jenkins made a threatening remark to him, which Carpenter relayed to
the investigating officer, Detective Williams. Williams told Carpenter
essentially not to worry about Jenkins, because he was just “a street

320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.

Id. at 6.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 1.
FINN & HEALEY, supra note 181, at xii.
Carpenter v. City of Los Angeles, 281 Cal. Rptr. 500, 500–02 (Ct. App. 1991).
Id. at 500.
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punk.”327 Thereafter, detectives were informed that Jenkins had a
“contract hit” out on Carpenter.328 That threat was never communicated
to Carpenter, who was subsequently shot in the head, abdomen, and
legs.329 After that, Carpenter was placed in a witness protection program
and moved to another state.330
The court of appeal in Carpenter fashioned the following rule: when a
criminal prosecution witness is assured by the city that the defendant
poses no real danger to the witness’s safety, then a special relationship is
established between the witness and the city.331 This relationship
establishes a duty of care owed by the city to the witness. In Carpenter,
this duty of care obligated the city to warn Carpenter of Jenkins’s threat
to his life.332
Considerations of policy mandate a finding that the City owed [Carpenter] a
duty of care. Reasonable care required that the police, after lulling [Carpenter]
into a false sense of security, inform him of this very real threat. We are
speaking here of a duty to warn. As evidenced by the Witness Protection
Program in which [Carpenter] was placed after being shot, the City already
recognizes it has a duty to protect certain witnesses.333

This case had an ironic and tragic result. Detective Williams sat with
the prosecution at Jenkins’s robbery trial in superior court. After
Detective Williams left the courthouse and picked up his son at the Faith
Baptist Church School, Jenkins murdered him. Jenkins was subsequently
convicted of first degree murder with special circumstances and
sentenced to death.334 He is currently on death row.335
Following Carpenter, the court of appeal was asked to decide whether
the city was negligent for the murder of a witness days before she was to
testify for the prosecution.336 In this case the witness, Demetria, had
been threatened personally in a telephone call she received.337 She
informed the detective of the threat, and the detective advised her that he
would provide relocation if the threats continued. He did not inform her
that the same defendant against whom she was to testify was a suspect in
two other murders, that he had been threatening other witnesses, that he
was carrying a handgun, and that he was considered a danger to the
327. Id. at 501.
328. See id. at 501–02.
329. Id. at 502.
330. Id.
331. Id. at 504.
332. Id.
333. Id. at 505 (citations omitted) (footnote omitted).
334. People v. Jenkins, 997 P.2d 1044, 1066–67 (Cal. 2000).
335. Cal. Dep’t of Corrs., Male Death Row Inmates, at http://www.cdc.state.ca.us/
Issues/Capital/PDF/Death_Row.pdf (Sept. 1, 2002).
336. Wallace v. City of Los Angeles, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 113, 114–15 (Ct. App. 1993).
337. Id. at 116–17.
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community at large, especially to any witnesses who might testify
against him. The detective knew all of this information at the time the
witness received the threats.338
The court found that when Demetria agreed to become a witness for
the prosecution, she was in a position of peril, which was not of her own
making, and which she could not on her own readily discover.339 The
police also “skewed her appreciation” of any danger and, in fact, gave
her the impression, by what they did and did not tell her, that she was
not in danger. The police, furthermore, placed Demetria in the
dangerous position she was in by involving her as a witness, and this
special relationship created a duty to warn her of the real danger to her
life.340
The court concluded:
If we were to hold that an officer can, with impunity, fail to disclose important
information to a witness regarding his or her safety, or induce a witness to
detrimentally rely on the officer regarding such safety, the number of persons
who would henceforth be willing to testify on behalf of the prosecution would
most likely fall dramatically. Consequently, so would the number of criminals
convicted for their crimes. As the court said in Carpenter, “‘Criminal
prosecution would screech to a grinding halt without the assistance of
witnesses.’”341

This conclusion raises the question of whether trial courts, if required
to order the discovery of identity of witnesses who have been attacked or
threatened, will expose city governments and courts to possible lawsuits
if the witness is subsequently killed. Furthermore, any newspaper
articles about such ordered discovery may have a chilling effect on other
witnesses to come forward and report criminal activity.
V. WAIVER BY MISCONDUCT
A. The Waiver Doctrine Is Based on Principles of Equity and Honesty
As noted earlier, confrontation, like any constitutional right, may
be surrendered either expressly or by conduct. One doctrine that has
been in existence since the seventeenth century is the doctrine of
“waiver by misconduct.”342 Succinctly stated, the doctrine provides that
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.

Id. at 117, 121.
See id. at 121.
See id. at 121–22.
Id. at 126.
The Court in Reynolds v. United States recounted Lord Morley’s case from the
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if a defendant, through misconduct, has prevented a witness from
appearing and testifying at his trial, then he has waived his right of
confrontation as to that witness and hearsay evidence with respect to that
witness’s testimony is admissible.343 The defendant may have procured
the witness’s nonappearance through threats, acts of violence, or murder;
in fact, many cases involve instances where the witness has been
murdered.344 The waiver doctrine has been followed in the federal
courts345 and was codified as a rule of evidence in 1997.346
year 1666, and others which followed it, for the proposition that if a witness was absent
from court “by the means or procurement of the prisoner,” then hearsay statements of the
witness were admissible in place of live testimony. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S.
145, 158–59 (1878).
343. See id. at 158–60.
344. See, e.g., United States v. Cherry, 217 F.3d 811, 813–15 (10th Cir. 2000);
United States v. Johnson, 219 F.3d 349, 352 (4th Cir. 2000); United States v. Emery, 186
F.3d 921, 924–26 (8th Cir. 1999); United States v. White, 116 F.3d 903, 911 (D.C. Cir.
1997); United States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1278–79 (1st Cir. 1996); United States
v. Thai, 29 F.3d 785, 798, 814 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v. Miller, 116 F.3d 641,
667–68 (2d Cir. 1993); United States v. Rouco, 765 F.2d 983, 985 (11th Cir. 1985);
United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 621 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. Mastrangelo,
693 F.2d 269, 270 (2d Cir. 1982).
345. See, e.g., Magouirk v. Warden, 237 F.3d 549, 552–53 (5th Cir. 2001); United
States v. Ochoa, 229 F.3d 631, 639 (7th Cir. 2000); Johnson, 219 F.3d at 355; Cherry,
217 F.3d at 814–21; Geraci v. Senkowski, 211 F.3d 6, 9–10 (2d Cir. 2000); Emery, 186
F.3d at 926–27; Magouirk v. Phillips, 144 F.3d 348, 361–62 (5th Cir. 1998); White, 116
F.3d at 911–16; Miller, 116 F.3d at 667–69; Houlihan, 92 F.3d at 1278–81; Thai, 29
F.3d at 814–15; United States v. Aguiar, 975 F.2d 45, 47–48 (2d Cir. 1992); Bagby v.
Kuhlman, 932 F.2d 131, 135–37 (2d Cir. 1991); Rouco, 765 F.2d at 995; United States v.
Potamitis, 739 F.2d 784, 788–89 (2d Cir. 1984); Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d at 272–73;
Steele v. Taylor, 684 F.2d 1193, 1200–03 (6th Cir. 1982); Thevis, 665 F.2d at 630–32;
United States v. Balano, 618 F.2d 624, 625–30 (10th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1355–60 (8th Cir. 1976).
346. In December 1997, subdivision (b)(6), which codified the waiver by
misconduct doctrine, was added to Rule 804 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Rule 804
now provides:
Rule 804. Hearsay Exceptions; Declarant Unavailable
(a)Definition of unavailability.: “Unavailability as a witness” includes
situations in which the declarant—
(1)is exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of privilege from
testifying concerning the subject matter of the declarant’s statement; or
(2)persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of the
declarant’s statement despite an order of the court to do so; or
(3)testifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter of the declarant’s
statement; or
(4)is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of death
or then existing physical or mental illness or infirmity; or
(5)is absent from the hearing and the proponent of a statement has
been unable to procure the declarant’s attendance (or in the case of a
hearsay exception under subdivision (b)(2), (3), or (4), the declarant’s
attendance or testimony) by process or other reasonable means.
A declarant is not unavailable as a witness if exemption, refusal, claim
of lack of memory, inability, or absence is due to the procurement or
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In one of the earliest statements of the waiver doctrine, the Reynolds
Court discussed the admissibility of a witness’s prior trial testimony,
when the defendant purposefully prevented the witness from appearing
and testifying in court.347 The defendant had been charged with bigamy.
His second wife lived at the defendant’s home and an officer had tried
several times to serve her with a subpoena to testify at the defendant’s
current trial, but the defendant had prevented service on the witness.
After a hearing about the subpoena service, the trial court found that the
witness’s nonappearance was caused by the defendant’s deliberate acts
and, therefore, ruled the witness’s prior trial testimony admissible.348
The court further found that the admission of the prior testimony did not
violate the defendant’s right to confrontation as to that witness:
The Constitution gives the accused the right to a trial at which he should be
confronted with the witnesses against him; but if a witness is absent by his own
wrongful procurement, he cannot complain if competent evidence is admitted to
supply the place of that which he has kept away. The Constitution does not
guarantee an accused person against the legitimate consequences of his own
wrongful acts. It grants him the privilege of being confronted with the
witnesses against him; but if he voluntarily keeps the witnesses away, he cannot
insist on his privilege. If, therefore, [the witnesses are] absent by his
procurement . . . he is in no condition to assert that his constitutional rights have
been violated.349

Principles of equity and honesty form the bedrock of the doctrine.
Similar to the equitable argument of “clean hands,”350 the doctrine
recognizes the principle that one shall not be allowed to profit from his
own wrongful conduct; in turn, this is based on principles of honesty,
namely, that one shall not be rewarded for his acts of dishonesty.351
wrongdoing of the proponent of a statement for the purpose of preventing
the witness from attending or testifying.
(b)Hearsay exceptions. The following are not excluded by the hearsay
rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness:
...
(6) Forfeiture by wrongdoing. A statement offered against a party
that has engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing that was intended to, and
did, procure the unavailability of the declarant as a witness.
FED. R. EVID. 804 (emphasis added).
347. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158–60 (1878).
348. See id. at 159–60.
349. Id. at 158.
350. Steele v. Taylor, 684 F.2d 1193, 1202 (6th Cir. 1982) (“The rule is also based
on a principle of reciprocity similar to the equitable doctrine of ‘clean hands.’”).
351. See Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 159.
The rule has its foundation in the maxim that no one shall be permitted to take

1219

FINALCASSANI2.DOC

2/4/2020 12:58 PM

Misconduct that procures a witness’s unavailability at trial involves an
intentional choice by the accused to prevent the admission of crucial
evidence—not by the use of legitimate rules of criminal procedure or
evidentiary restrictions, but by acts of subterfuge. One who intentionally
threatens a witness, attacks a witness, or has another commit such acts at
his behest, has freely chosen to use deceptive means to obtain an
advantage. When the witness is crucial, such misconduct may decimate
the prosecution’s case.352 The loss of that testimony will result in the
prosecution being unable to proceed with its case. By precluding this
testimony, the defendant has not used the accepted rules of criminal
procedure or evidence, but has resorted to nefarious conduct to obtain an
advantage or an outright dismissal. Such misconduct also violates the
prosecution’s right to present its evidence and carry its burden of proof.
When a defendant murders an individual who is a percipient witness to acts
of criminality (or procures his demise) in order to prevent him from appearing
at an upcoming trial, he denies the government the benefit of the witness’s live
testimony. In much the same way, when a defendant murders such a witness (or
procures his demise) in order to prevent him from assisting an ongoing criminal
investigation, he is denying the government the benefit of the witness’s live
testimony at a future trial.353

In cases where the defendant’s misconduct procures the unavailability
of a witness, this misconduct, rather than the applicable legal principles,
may determine the outcome. The outcome may be based on the
defendant’s chicanery, rather than on reliable evidence tested by the trier
of fact, who has the opportunity to listen to the witness and judge his or
her credibility. If the witness does testify, but the defendant’s
intimidation causes the witness to give false, incomplete or misleading
testimony, cross-examination may or may not bring out the truth. Even
if cross-examination does bring out the truth, the misconduct by the
defendant will introduce false evidence into the record, which may
produce an unjust decision.354 In this way, the defendant’s misconduct
undermines the integrity of the adversary process, the very system which
the Confrontation Clause was intended to protect, and is, therefore,
necessarily dishonest and inequitable.
Since its initial formulation, the doctrine has undergone numerous
changes. As noted, it has been codified into a federal rule of evidence

Id.

advantage of his own wrong . . . . We are content with this long-established
usage, which, so far as we have been able to discover, has rarely been departed
from. It is the outgrowth of a maxim based on the principles of common
honesty, and, if properly administered, can harm no one.
352.
353.
354.
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and the Advisory Committee observed that the rule was intended
to provide that a party forfeits the right to object on hearsay grounds to the
admission of a declarant’s prior statement when the party’s deliberate
wrongdoing or acquiescence therein procured the unavailability of the declarant
as a witness. This recognizes the need for a prophylactic rule to deal with
abhorrent behavior “which strikes at the heart of the system of justice itself.”355

The doctrine encompasses not only situations where the defendant’s
acts were the direct cause of the witness unavailability, but also those
cases where third parties have caused the witness’s unavailability, either
at the behest of the defendant or in a conspiracy with the defendant.356
As a result, co-conspirators are subject to the doctrine if their acts are “in
furtherance and within the scope of an ongoing conspiracy and
reasonably foreseeable as a natural or necessary consequence thereof.”357
Moreover, the doctrine has expanded to allow into evidence not only
prior trial testimony, but also grand jury testimony,358 as well as
statements to police officers and other unsworn extrajudicial
statements.359
The courts that have utilized the doctrine have required an evidentiary
hearing, wherein the proponent of the hearsay evidence must carry its
burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence.360 Some courts
have found that the failure to hold an evidentiary hearing is harmless

355. FED. R. EVID. 804 advisory committee’s note (quoting United States v.
Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269, 273 (2d Cir. 1982)). The Advisory Committee also noted
that the wrongful act need not be a criminal act. Id.
356. See, e.g., United States v. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d 635, 653–54 (2d Cir. 2001); United
States v. Cherry, 217 F.3d 811, 820–21 (10th Cir. 2000).
357. Cherry, 217 F.3d at 820.
358. See, e.g., Geraci v. Senkowski, 211 F.3d 6, 9–10 (2d Cir. 2000); United States
v. Potamitis, 739 F.2d 784, 788–89 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Mastrangelo, 693
F.2d 269, 272–73 (2d Cir. 1982); United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 627–30 (5th
Cir. 1982); United States v. Balano, 618 F.2d 624, 629–30 (10th Cir. 1979); United
States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1360 (8th Cir. 1976).
359. See, e.g., Dhinsa, 243 F.3d at 650–57; United States v. Ochoa, 229 F.3d 631,
639–41 (7th Cir. 2000); United States v. Johnson, 219 F.3d 349, 355–56 (4th Cir. 2000);
Cherry, 217 F.3d at 819–21; United States v. Emery, 186 F.3d 921, 926 (8th Cir. 1999);
United States v. White, 116 F.3d 903, 911 (D.C. Cir. 1997); United States v. Miller, 116
F.3d 641, 667–68 (2d Cir. 1997); United States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1279–80 (1st
Cir. 1996); United States v. Thai, 29 F.3d 785, 814–15 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v.
Aguiar, 975 F.2d 45, 47–48 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v. Rouco, 765 F.2d 983, 993–
95 (11th Cir. 1985).
360. Only one court prior to the codification of the doctrine required proof by clear
and convincing evidence. Thevis, 665 F.2d at 630–31.

1221

FINALCASSANI2.DOC

2/4/2020 12:58 PM

error.361 In Reynolds, the Court noted that although the defendant was
present at the hearing on service of subpoena, he failed to provide any
contrary evidence.362 Other courts have interpreted this as an indication
by the Supreme Court that the proponent of the hearsay evidence has the
burden of persuasion by a preponderance test as in preliminary fact
determinations; however, once this burden is met, adverse inferences
may be drawn from the defense’s failure to offer credible evidence to the
contrary. 363
Courts have also applied the doctrine when no charges have been filed
against the defendant at the time of the misconduct.364 As long as it is
reasonably foreseeable that an investigation will culminate in the
bringing of criminal charges, the fact that the misdeed occurred at an
earlier stage should not affect the operation and application of the
doctrine.365 A contrary approach would create an incentive to accelerate
the timetable and murder witnesses earlier rather than later.366 The
doctrine has been applied in this context even though the right to
confront is a trial right.367
The waiver doctrine does not penalize the defendant, but rather
attempts to level the uneven playing field created by the misconduct of
the accused.368 Since the defendant has, by his contrivance, prevented
the witness from appearing and testifying, it would be an absurdity to
permit the same person to claim that his constitutional right to confront
and cross-examine the witness has been violated. Acquiescence to such
an objection would result in the prosecution losing valuable evidence,
because the hearsay statements would be inadmissible. Acquiescence
would also result in rewarding the defendant for his misdeed. The very
testimony that the defendant intended to prevent the jury from hearing
would be unavailable to the prosecution; such a result was specifically
eschewed by the Reynolds Court.369 The better view is that the
361. See, e.g., Johnson, 219 F.3d at 356; Miller, 116 F.3d at 669.
362. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 160 (1878).
363. See White, 116 F.2d at 911–13; Houlihan, 92 F.3d at 1278–83; Thevis, 665
F.2d at 632–33; Morgan v. Bennett, 204 F.3d 360, 367–68 (2d Cir. 2000).
364. See, e.g., Dhinsa, 243 F.3d at 652; Emery, 186 F.3d at 925–26; Miller, 116
F.3d at 667; Houlihan, 92 F.3d at 1279.
365. Houlihan, 92 F.3d at 1280.
366. Id.
367. See id. at 1279.
368. See Steele v. Taylor, 684 F.2d 1193, 1202 (6th Cir. 1982); White, 116 F.3d at
912; Houlihan, 92 F.3d at 1280–83; Magouirk v. Phillips, 144 F.3d 348, 361–62 (5th
Cir. 1998); Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d at 272–73; Balano, 618 F.2d at 629; Carlson, 547
F.2d at 1359 & n.12.
369. If the testimony is not presented at trial, then the defendant has profited from
his misconduct. This result is contrary to the principle enunciated by the Reynolds
Court. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158 (1878) (stating that courts will not
allow a party to profit from his own wrongdoing).
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defendant has waived his right of confrontation and cannot complain that
he was denied the right to confront and cross-examine the witness,
because he was the instrument of the witness’s nonappearance.370 To
limit the introduction of such evidence would limit the proof against the
defendant, the very result which the waiver doctrine seeks to remedy.371
These same basic principles should obtain when the doctrine is applied
to withholding the identity of threatened witnesses, as will be shown.
B. A Defendant Who Has Threatened or Attacked a Crucial Witness
Has Waived His Right to Know the Witness’s Identity
1.

Introduction

There is no reason why the waiver by misconduct doctrine should not
be extended to allow the nondisclosure of a threatened witness’s
identity. There are several reasons that weigh in favor of nondisclosure,
including public policy,372 equity, and fairness.373 Each of these factors,
as will be shown, tip the balance in favor of the witness’s rights as
opposed to the defendant’s right of confrontation, and thus weigh against
disclosure.374
Admittedly, there are differences between the issue of witness identity
nondisclosure and the issue originally addressed by the waiver doctrine,
that is, the defendant’s procurement of a witness’s unavailability at trial.
Unlike the waiver doctrine’s traditional application, where the witness is
identified but not presented at trial, application of the doctrine to allow
the nondisclosure of a threatened witness’s identity would involve a
witness who is presented at trial, but not identified. Moreover, allowing
the nondisclosure of witness identity would not involve the admission of
hearsay evidence because the witness himself would testify in court.
These differences, however, do not preclude extending the doctrine to
370. See Carlson, 547 F.2d at 1359.
371. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d at 652–53.
372. Public policy considerations may limit the scope of the right of confrontation.
Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 844–49 (1990); Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1020–21
(1988); Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 62–65 (1980); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S.
284, 295 (1973).
373. See Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 158–59.
374. See Craig, 497 U.S. at 844–45 (“In holding that the use of this procedure
violated the defendant’s right to confront witnesses against him, we suggested that any
exception to the right ‘would surely be allowed only when necessary to further an
important public policy.’”).
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allow for nondisclosure of a witness’s identity if the witness’s life has
been threatened by the defendant’s misconduct.375
Invocation of the waiver by misconduct doctrine to preclude
identifying the witness would require an evidentiary hearing at which the
prosecution would be required to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence376 (1) that the defendant, or another at his behest, has
threatened the life of the witness or a member of the witness’s
immediate family; (2) that the defendant has the means and capability of
carrying out the threat; (3) that the defendant caused the witness’s
fear;377 (4) that the action was taken with the intention of preventing the
witness from testifying;378 and (5) that the witness is in actual fear for his
or her life, or for the lives of family members. If all of these elements
are proved by a preponderance of the evidence, then the witness’s
identity is foreclosed from disclosure to the defense.
2.

Public Policy Considerations Weigh in Favor of Nondisclosure

In one of its earlier opinions, the United States Supreme Court
addressed the admissibility at the defendant’s retrial of prior trial
testimony given by two witnesses who had died since the first trial.379
The issue was whether the admission of the prior trial testimony violated
375. Although it may seem unlikely that a witness could be attacked or threatened
and the accused not know the person’s identity, there are several ways this is possible.
First, not all defendants are in custody throughout their proceedings and, thus, have the
ability to follow a witness. Furthermore, a witness may have been present at pretrial
hearings and followed from the courtroom by the defendant or by cohorts of the
defendant. Or, the witness’s identity may have been disclosed to the defense, but
because of threats the witness may have been given a new identity. Of course, there are
other possible scenarios in which this issue may arise.
376. California Evidence Code section 115 provides:
“Burden of proof” means the obligation of a party to establish by
evidence a requisite degree of belief concerning a fact in the mind of the trier
of fact or the court. The burden of proof may require a party to raise a
reasonable doubt concerning the existence or nonexistence of a fact or that he
establish the existence or nonexistence of a fact by a preponderance of the
evidence, by clear and convincing proof, or by proof beyond a reasonable
doubt.
Except as otherwise provided by law, the burden of proof requires proof
by a preponderance of the evidence.
CAL. EVID. CODE § 115 (West 1995 & Supp. 2002).
377. See United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269, 273–74 (2d Cir. 1982)
(holding that the defendant’s knowledge of a plot to kill a witness and a failure to give a
warning to the appropriate authorities is sufficient to constitute a waiver to the admission
of hearsay evidence).
378. See United States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1280 (1st Cir. 1996).
379. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 251 (1895). In Mattox, a capital case,
the judgment in the first trial was reversed and a second trial resulted in a hung jury. In a
third trial the accused was found guilty and sentenced to death. Id.
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the defendant’s right of confrontation.380
During the course of its discussions, the Court balanced the
defendant’s confrontation right against public policy considerations and
the necessities of the case.381 The Court acknowledged, on the one hand,
the safeguards embodied in the constitutional protection of
confrontation, but found, on the other hand, that the rights of the people
may, in certain cases, outweigh the need for these safeguards.382 The
Court concluded that when the safety of the public is imperiled, and the
rights of the accused are otherwise protected, “[a] technical adherence to
the letter of a constitutional provision” is outweighed by the concern for
public safety.383 Moreover, exceptions to the right of confrontation may
be required by the necessities of a case in order “to prevent a manifest
failure of justice.”384 In determining when an exception is required, the
Court stated that public policy considerations, such as public safety
and society’s interest in justice, should be weighed against the
380. Id. at 240–44, 251.
381. Id. at 243 (“But general rules of law of this kind, however beneficent in their
operation and valuable to the accused, must occasionally give way to considerations of
public policy and the necessities of the case.”).
382. Id. (“The law in its wisdom declares that the rights of the public shall not be
wholly sacrificed in order that an incidental benefit may be preserved to the accused.”);
Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1020 (1988) (“It is true that we have in the past indicated
that rights conferred by the Confrontation Clause are not absolute, and may give way to
other important interests.”); id. at 1021 (“We leave for another day whether any
exceptions exist. Whatever they may be, they would surely be allowed only when
necessary to further an important public policy.”); id. at 1025 (O’Connor, J., concurring)
(“In short, our precedents recognize a right to face-to-face confrontation at trial, but have
never viewed that right as absolute . . . . Thus, I would permit use of a particular trial
procedure that called for something other than face-to-face confrontation if procedure
was necessary to further an important public policy.”).
The court, however, has recognized that competing interests, if “closely
examined,”. . . may warrant dispensing with confrontation at trial. “General
rules of law of this kind, however beneficent and valuable in their operation
and valuable to the accused, must occasionally give way to considerations of
public policy and the necessities of the case.”
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64 (1980) (quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237,
243 (1895)); see also Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973) (“Of course,
the right to confront and to cross-examine is not absolute and may, in appropriate cases,
bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process.”).
383. Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243. (“A technical adherence to the letter of a
constitutional provision may occasionally be carried farther than is necessary to the just
protection of the accused, and farther than the safety of the public will warrant.”).
384. Id. at 244 (“[Hearsay statements] are admitted . . . as an exception to such
rules, simply from the necessities of the case, and to prevent a manifest failure of
justice.”).
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defendant’s right of confrontation.385 The Court concluded that such
policy concerns may, in certain cases, outweigh the constitutional right
of the defendant.
As Justice Cardozo wrote:
The law . . . is sedulous in maintaining for a defendant charged with crime whatever
forms of procedure are of the essence of an opportunity to defend. Privileges so
fundamental as to be inherent in every concept of a fair trial that could be acceptable
to the thought of reasonable men will be kept inviolate and inviolable, however
crushing may be the pressure of incriminating proof. But justice, though due to the
accused, is due to the accuser also. The concept of fairness must not be strained
till it is narrowed to a filament. We are to keep the balance true.386

There are several public policy concerns in favor of nondisclosure.
Building public confidence in our criminal justice system and
maintaining an effective criminal justice system are both public policy
goals of the highest order.387 Witness intimidation undermines the
criminal justice system, erodes confidence in the government’s ability to
protect its citizens, and degrades the integrity of the judicial process.388
Nondisclosure of threatened witness identities would help to ameliorate
these effects.
Another public policy concern favoring nondisclosure is the
encouragement of citizens to report their knowledge of criminal activity.
Citizen cooperation is critically important to law enforcement.389
385. See id. at 242–44; Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 850 (1990) (finding that
the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses must be interpreted in the context of
the necessities of the trial, the adversary process, and with concern for public policy); id.
at 849 (“In sum, our precedents establish that ‘the Confrontation Clause reflects a
preference for face-to-face confrontation at trial,’ . . . a preference that ‘must
occasionally give way to considerations of public policy and the necessities of the case.’”
(emphasis in original) (citations omitted)); id. at 852 (“The critical inquiry in this
case . . . is whether use of the procedure is necessary to further an important state
interest.”); id. at 853 (“We likewise conclude today that a State’s interest in the physical
and psychological well-being of child abuse victims may be sufficiently important to
outweigh, at least in some cases, a defendant’s right to face his or her accusers in
court.”).
[W]here necessary to protect a child witness from trauma that would be caused
by testifying in the physical presence of the defendant, at least where such
trauma would impair the child’s ability to communicate, the Confrontation
Clause does not prohibit use of a procedure that, despite the absence of face-toface confrontation, ensures the reliability of the evidence by subjecting it to
rigorous adversarial testing and thereby preserves the essence of effective
confrontation.
Id. at 857.
386. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 122 (1934).
387. See Wallace v. City of Los Angeles, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 113, 127 (Ct. App. 1993).
388. See Morgan v. Bennett, 204 F.3d 360, 367 (2d Cir. 2000); see also supra notes
181–86 and accompanying text.
389. See McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 308 (1967); Lewis v. United States, 385
U.S. 206, 210 & n.6 (1966); Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 59–60 (1957); United
States v. Sanchez, 988 F.2d 1384, 1391 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Toombs, 497 F.2d

1226

FINALCASSANI2.DOC

[VOL. 39: 1165, 2002]

2/4/2020 12:58 PM

The Waiver Doctrine After Alvarado
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

Without citizen cooperation, the criminal justice system would grind to
a halt.390 Such cooperation is thwarted, however, by community
intimidation.391 Gang members commonly assault individuals in full
view of other neighborhood residents in order to intimidate the residents
and to dissuade them from reporting criminal activity to the police.392
Respect in the gang subculture is often synonymous with fear.
Retaliatory murders are committed to promote respect for the gang and
intimidate those outside the gang. This is well-known in the criminal
justice system.393 If law enforcement fails to protect those who come
forward with information about criminal activity even after they are
attacked and threatened, other citizens will be discouraged from
reporting future criminal activity. Requiring disclosure of a threatened
witness’s identity will weaken other citizens’ resolve to perform their
civic and moral duty to report crime. This result is contrary to the
important policy goal of encouraging citizens to report crime.394
Yet another public policy concern is the safety of witnesses who
testify. Disclosure of a witness’s identity to the defense after the witness
has been attacked or threatened by the defendant exposes the witness to
possibly lethal consequences. There should be “a greater level of
official concern and action promotive of witness safety” and “the long
term result surely will be an increase in both the effectiveness of the
criminal justice system and the level of public confidence in it. The
attainment of that result is certainly a public policy goal of very high
priority.”395
Our government also has a strong interest in assuring prospective
witnesses that they will be free to attend trial to testify as a witness,
without fear of intimidation or threats.396 Moreover, as will be shown,
government has a duty and obligation to act in order to protect a
witness’s constitutional right to testify.397
By encouraging witnesses to report crime and to testify, nondisclosure
88, 91–92 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Palermo, 410 F.2d 468, 472 (7th Cir. 1969).
390. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 679 (West 1999).
391. See supra Part IV.A.2.
392. See People v. Gardeley, 927 P.2d 713, 722 (Cal. 1996).
393. See People v. Olguin, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 596, 611 (Ct. App. 1994).
394. See McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 308 (1967).
395. Wallace v. City of Los Angeles, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 113, 127 (Ct. App. 1993).
396. See United States v. Pacelli, 491 F.2d 1108, 1113 (2d Cir. 1974) (holding that
the right to testify is one guaranteed by law).
397. See infra notes 433–39 and accompanying text.
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also favors the important policy goal of effective law enforcement. In
the analogous case of confidential reliable informants, there is a
government privilege to withhold the identity of persons who furnish
information to police officers. This privilege is meant to further and to
protect the public interest in effective law enforcement.398 Usually,
informants condition their cooperation on an assurance of anonymity to
protect themselves and their families from harm.399 Law enforcement, in
turn, depends greatly on information from informants in order to solve
crimes. Disclosing informants’ identities ends their usefulness to
government and discourages others from cooperating.400 Furthermore,
public policy forbids disclosure of confidential informants’ identities
unless essential to the defense and material on the issue of guilt.401 But
even in the case of confidential informants, there is no fixed rule as to
disclosure, and decisions must be made “balancing the public interest in
protecting the flow of information against the individual’s right to prepare
his defense.”402 “Whether a proper balance renders nondisclosure erroneous
must depend on the particular circumstances of each case, taking into
consideration the crime charged, the possible defenses, the possible
significance of the informer’s testimony, and other relevant factors.”403
Courts have long recognized the difficulty prosecutors and police have in
obtaining witness cooperation when the witness’s life may be in danger.404
As our society becomes increasingly violent in its daily human interactions,
more and more people are called upon to be witnesses in the prosecution of
those causing the violence. Yet, as the number of these potential witnesses
grows, so also does the likelihood that they, or their families, will be subjected
to violence by the very criminal defendants against whom they will give
testimony. Thus, the old phrase “violence begets violence” takes on a new

398. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 59 (1957) (“The privilege recognizes
the obligation of citizens to communicate their knowledge of the commission of crimes
to law-enforcement officials and, by preserving their anonymity, encourages them to
perform that obligation.”).
399. McCray, 386 U.S. at 308.
400. See id. at 308; Dep’t of Justice v. Landano, 508 U.S. 165, 179–81 (1993);
Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 208–10 (1966); United States v. Sanchez, 988 F.2d
1384, 1391 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Toombs, 497 F.2d 88, 94 (5th Cir. 1974);
United States v. Twomey, 460 F.2d 400, 401–03 (7th Cir. 1972); United States v. Ellis,
468 F.2d 638, 639 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Palermo, 410 F.2d 468, 472–73 (7th
Cir. 1969).
401. See Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251, 254 (1938).
402. McCray, 386 U.S. at 310 (quoting Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 62); id. at 312 (“In
sum, the Court in the exercise of its power to formulate evidentiary rules for federal
criminal cases has consistently declined to hold that an informer’s identity need always
be disclosed in a federal criminal trial . . . .”).
403. Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 62.
404. Palermo, 410 F.2d at 472 (“This Court is not unaware of the problem that the
government has in obtaining witnesses in cases where a witness’ life may be in jeopardy
if he testifies.”); see also Alvarado v. Superior Court, 5 P.3d 203, 222 (Cal. 2000).
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meaning. The threat to the safety of these witnesses is very real, especially
when the defendant has gang or drug trafficking affiliations. Unfortunately, the
lack of safeguards for such witnesses is also very real.
Society reaps enormous benefits when a witness’s testimony succeeds in
getting a criminal off the streets and placed behind bars. Society must be
willing to pay for that benefit by affording necessary protection to both the
witness and his family, for the threat of violence against a witness’s family will
often silence the witness. Without a continuing and visible public commitment
to such protection, it is unrealistic to expect citizens to come forward and
provide the information so critical to the successful operation of the criminal
justice system. To the extent that government fails to meet this essential
responsibility, it cedes control of our cities to the criminals.
If the result which we reach in the case before us brings about a greater
level of official concern and action promotive of witness safety, and an
appropriate devotion of public resources to that end, the long term result surely
will be an increase in both the effectiveness of the criminal justice system and
the level of public confidence in it. The attainment of that result is certainly a
public policy goal of very high priority.405

Indeed, several courts have found that where there is a threat to the
life of a witness, the right of the defendant to have the witness’s true
name, address, and other personal information is not absolute.406 Thus,
the public has a great interest in effective law enforcement and the
government, in turn, recognizes that citizens have an obligation to
inform law enforcement of criminal activity that is within their
knowledge.407 Preserving their anonymity, when possible, encourages
citizens to perform their obligation.408 Justice O’Connor recently opined
that “[m]ost people would think that witnesses to a gang-related murder
likely would be unwilling to speak to the [FBI] except on the condition
of confidentiality.”409
Finally, there is a strong public interest in blocking an accused’s
attempt to subvert the criminal prosecution by threatening or attacking
material witnesses who have information which inculpates the accused.
This is misconduct of the highest order, detrimental to the ability of
government to carry out its duties and obligations to prosecute crime and
to protect its citizens. “[T]he first duty of government by consent [is]
maintenance of the public order.” The government has an obligation not
405. Wallace v. City of Los Angeles, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 113, 126–27 (Ct. App. 1993).
406. See, e.g., Palermo, 410 F.2d at 472; United States v. Varella, 692 F.2d 1352,
1356 (11th Cir. 1982); United States v. Rangel, 534 F.2d 147, 148 (9th Cir. 1976);
United States v. Ellis, 468 F.2d 638, 639 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Twomey, 460
F.2d 400, 403 (7th Cir. 1972).
407. See Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 59.
408. Id.
409. Dep’t of Justice v. Landano, 508 U.S. 165, 179 (1993).
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only “‘to promote the interest of all, [but] to prevent the wrongdoing of
one resulting in injury to the general welfare.’”410
Thus, in this narrow circumstance, when a defendant is responsible for
the threats or attacks which cause a witness to fear for his life,
competing public policy interests warrant dispensing with the
defendant’s right to know that witness’s identity.411 The necessities of
this fact situation override the defendant’s right to know the witness’s
identity.412
3.

Equitable Principles Weigh in Favor of Nondisclosure

The equitable doctrine that “no one shall be permitted to take
advantage of his own wrong” is “based on the principles of common
honesty.”413 The primary purpose of the waiver by misconduct doctrine
is to prevent a wrongdoer from profitting in a court of law by reason of
his misdeeds.414 A defendant may not claim a violation of his
constitutional rights when his own misconduct created the violation.
Not only would it be unfair and morally wrong to allow one to use
dishonest means to attain a legal advantage, it would create an incentive
for others to so act.415 Thus, one who intimidates or attacks a witness to
prevent that witness from testifying should not be allowed to assert a
denial of his right of confrontation based on the prosecution’s intent to
withhold the identity of that witness, because the witness’s fear and
threatened status is due to the defendant’s acts and threats. The waiver
doctrine provides in those circumstances that the defendant “cannot
insist on his privilege,” since by his own wrongful conduct he has
waived his confrontation rights as to that witness.416
In considering a defendant who asserted a constitutional violation
because his trial proceeded during his voluntary absence, the United
States Supreme Court stated the following:
410. People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596, 605 (Cal. 1997) (quoting In re
Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 584 (1895)).
411. Cf. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64 (1980) (Thus in certain narrow
circumstances “competing interests, if ‘closely examined,’ . . . may warrant dispensing
with confrontation at trial.” (citation omitted)); accord Chambers v. Mississippi, 410
U.S. 284, 295 (1973); Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 849 (1990); Coy v. Iowa, 487
U.S. 1012, 1020–21 (1988).
412. A preference for face-to-face confrontation at trial “must occasionally give
way to considerations of public policy and the necessities of the case.” Mattox v. United
States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895); accord Craig, 497 U.S. at 849.
413. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 159 (1878).
414. United States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1282–83 (1st Cir. 1996).
415. See id. at 1280 (“Not allowing the statement of a witness made before charges
were filed would serve as a prod to the unscrupulous to accelerate the time table and
murder suspected snitches sooner rather than later.”).
416. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 158; accord Mattox, 156 U.S. at 242.
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The question is one of broad public policy, whether an accused person,
placed upon trial for crime and protected by all the safeguards with which the
humanity of our present criminal law sedulously surrounds him, can with
impunity defy the processes of that law, paralyze the proceedings of courts and
juries and turn them into a solemn farce, and ultimately compel society, for its
own safety, to restrict the operation of the principle of personal liberty. Neither
in criminal nor in civil cases will the law allow a person to take advantage of his
own wrong.417

The doctrine of waiver by misconduct protects the integrity of the
adversary process by deterring attempts by defendants to prevent the
testimony of adverse witnesses.418 The waiver doctrine is somewhat
similar to the equitable doctrine of clean hands, that one cannot
complain of a wrong committed by another while he himself is guilty of
having committed wrongful acts.419 To attack, or threaten a material
witness in order to prevent that witness’s testimony at trial, and yet
demand disclosure of the witness’s identity based on the claim of a
constitutional right to that knowledge, is more egregious because the
alleged violation is created by the one who would assert it. The law will
not sanction the practice of threatening witnesses and should not permit
such conduct to benefit the defendant.420
As stated earlier, the central concern of the Confrontation Clause is to
provide a procedure which will insure the reliability of the evidence
offered against a defendant. But the “Sixth Amendment does not stand
as a shield to protect the accused from his own misconduct or
chicanery.”421 When a defendant’s misconduct violates the heart of the
procedure put in place to protect his rights, he should not be afforded the
protection of the Clause.422 In other words, the accused should not be
permitted to assert a denial of his confrontation rights when refused the
identity of the witness, when he himself was the instrument and cause of
the denial.423 When confrontation becomes impossible due to the very
person who would assert that right, equity should intervene to provide

417. Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 458 (1912) (quoting Falk v. United States,
15 App. D.C. 446, 460 (1899)).
418. Steele v. Taylor, 684 F.2d 1193, 1202 (6th Cir. 1982).
419. Id.
420. United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1359 (8th Cir. 1976).
421. United States v. Rouco, 765 F.2d 983, 995 (11th Cir. 1985) (quoting Carlson,
547 F.2d at 1359).
422. See Carlson, 547 F.2d at 1359.
423. See United States v. White, 116 F.3d 903, 911 (D.C. Cir. 1997); United States
v. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d 635, 652 (2d Cir. 2001).
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that the right has been waived.424
Just as a defendant who has removed an adverse witness through
murder is in no position to complain about losing the chance to crossexamine the witness,425 so is the defendant in a weak position to
complain about not knowing a witness’s identity when he is the cause of
possible lethal consequences feared by the witness. Withholding the
witness’s identity partially offsets the harm caused by the defendant’s
wrongful actions.426 A contrary rule would serve as an incentive to
perpetuate this type of wrongful conduct.427
The Confrontation Clause was meant to protect against the use of
anonymous accusers; however, anonymous accusers originally referred
to individuals who signed declarations, did not attend trial, did not swear
to the truth of their statements, and did not face the triers of fact or the
defendant. The situation is quite different where a crucial witness’s
identity is withheld but the witness does attend trial, does swear to tell
the truth, does testify before the trier of fact and the defendant, face-toface, and is subject to cross-examination. Thus, even if the witness is
unnamed, the witness is not anonymous in the sense of the Star Chamber
declarants. The witness, unlike those declarants, is subject to crossexamination and has been the subject of whatever discovery is available.
As an alternative, an independent third attorney and investigator could
be appointed by the court and given the witness’s identity. That team
could investigate the witness’s background and report its findings only
to the defense, but not the witness’s name, and in this way, a barrier is
provided to prevent accidental dissemination of the witness’s identity.
Simple equity, therefore, also supports the conclusion that the accused
may not assert a violation of his confrontation rights as to that witness’s
identity. Just as the Clause was designed to protect against the dangers
of untested testimony by anonymous accusers, the waiver doctrine is
designed to protect against the dangers of misconduct by the accused.
By such misconduct an accused may forfeit the protections afforded
under the Clause and allow the nondisclosure of a witness’s identity.428
In construing the balance, the main interest that must be offset against
the government’s need to withhold the witness’s identity is the accused’s
right of confrontation. “Once the confrontation right is lifted from the
424. See United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 630 (5th Cir. 1982).
425. See White, 116 F.3d at 911; Dhinsa, 243 F.3d at 652.
426. See White, 116 F.3d at 911.
427. See Dhinsa, 243 F.3d at 652.
428. See United States v. Sanchez, 988 F.2d 1384, 1391–92 (5th Cir. 1993); United
States v. Varella, 692 F.2d 1352, 1356 (11th Cir. 1982); United States v. Rangel, 534
F.2d 147, 148 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Ellis, 468 F.2d 638, 639 (9th Cir. 1972);
United States v. Jordan, 466 F.2d 99, 101–02 (4th Cir. 1972).
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scales by operation of the accused’s waiver of that right, the balance tips
sharply in favor” of the protection of the witness’s identity.429
The law simply cannot countenance a defendant deriving benefits
from murdering the chief witness against him. To permit such
subversion of a criminal prosecution “would be contrary to public
policy, common sense, and the underlying purpose of the confrontation
clause,”. . . and make a mockery of the system of justice that the right
was designed to protect.430
Once the defendant has waived his right of confrontation by
misconduct, he has a fortiori waived his right of cross-examination.
Thus, he has waived his right to know the witness’s identity. The law
has never countenanced piecemeal waivers; thus, a waiver by
misconduct would be a waiver as to all aspects of the right.431
4.

Balancing of Witness’s Rights Against Those of the Defendant
Weighs in Favor of Nondisclosure

Yet another factor weighs in favor of nondisclosure: on balance, the
rights of witnesses outweigh those of the accused. Cases that discuss the
issue of nondisclosure fail to also discuss the rights, duties, and
obligations of witnesses. In fact, not much is written about the
obligations society and the law place on those who, through
happenstance, become crucial witnesses in criminal prosecutions.432 It is
429. See United States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1281 (1st Cir. 1996) (stating that
the balance tips in favor of the need for evidence once the defendant waives his right of
confrontation); Thevis, 665 F.2d at 632–33 (stating that once the defendant’s interest in
confrontation is removed by waiver, the balance tips in favor of the need for evidence).
430. United States v. Rouco, 765 F.2d 983, 995 (11th Cir. 1985) (alteration in
original) (quoting Thevis, 665 F.2d at 630 (quoting United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d
1346, 1359 (8th Cir. 1976))); United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269, 273 (2d Cir.
1982); Steele v. Taylor, 684 F.2d 1193, 1202 (6th Cir. 1982).
431. See Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 452–53 (1912) (“As here the accused,
by his voluntary act, placed in evidence the testimony disclosed by the record in
question, and thereby sought to obtain an advantage from it, he waived his right of
confrontation as to that testimony and cannot now complain of its consideration.”);
United States v. White, 116 F.3d 903, 912 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Houlihan, 92 F.3d at 1281
(“[Defendants’] misconduct waived not only their confrontation rights but also their
hearsay objections, thus rendering a special finding of reliability superfluous.”); United
States v. Aguiar, 975 F.2d 45, 47 (2d Cir. 1992) (“A defendant who procures a witness’s
absence waives the right of confrontation for all purposes with regard to that witness, not
just to the admission of sworn hearsay statements.”); Thevis, 665 F.2d at 630 (“[W]aiver
of . . . confrontation [necessarily includes] a waiver of any hearsay objection.”).
432. Under the law, crime victims and witnesses have a civil and moral duty to
cooperate with law enforcement and prosecutors in the prosecution of criminal cases.
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interesting that none of these cases discuss the constitutional rights of
affected witnesses, even though that discussion is important to any
balancing test. Therefore, in order to balance the accused’s rights as to
those threatened witnesses, it is essential to examine the rights granted to
crime victims and witnesses.
Since 1895, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that
citizens have not only a civic duty to report crime, but a constitutional
right to do so.433 Admittedly, there is no language in the Constitution
which specifically grants that right, but the right is intrinsic to, and arises
from, the very creation and establishment of our government, and as
such, is a right secured to all by the Constitution.434
Government, in turn, has an important interest in the public health and
safety of its citizens. Under its parens patriae powers, it also has a duty
to care for its citizens. And, under its police powers, government has an
obligation and duty to protect its citizens from the criminal tendencies of
others.435 Anyone who conspires to violate a citizen’s right to report
crime is subject to punishment.436 In that regard, government has a
corresponding duty to protect citizens from violence occasioned by the
exercise of their right to report crime.437 “By entering society,
See CAL. PENAL CODE § 679 (West 1999); see also In re Quarles, 158 U.S. 532, 535–36
(1895) (“It is . . . [a citizen’s] right and his duty to communicate to the executive officers
any information which he has of the commission of an offence against those laws; and
such information, given by a private citizen, is a privileged and confidential
communication . . . .”); Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 59 (1957) (“The privilege
[to withhold a confidential informant’s identity] recognizes the obligation of citizens to
communicate their knowledge of the commission of crimes to law-enforcement officials
and, by preserving their anonymity, encourages them to perform that obligation.”); see
also United States v. Sanchez, 988 F.2d 1384, 1391 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v.
Toombs, 497 F.2d 88, 92 (5th Cir. 1974).
433. Quarles, 158 U.S. at 536 (“The right of a citizen informing of a violation of
law . . . does not depend upon any of the Amendments to the Constitution, but arises out
of the creation and establishment by the Constitution itself of a national government,
paramount and supreme within its sphere of action.”).
434. Id. at 536–37 (“The necessary conclusion is, that it is the right of every private
citizen of the United States to inform a marshal . . . of a violation of the . . . laws of the
United States; that this right is secured to the citizen by the Constitution of the United
States . . . .”).
435. ‘Parens patriae’ literally, ‘parent of the country’ refers traditionally to the
role of the state as sovereign and guardian of persons under a legal disability to
act for themselves. . . . Recently, the doctrine has been used to allow the state
to recover damages to quasi-sovereign contracts wholly apart from recoverable
injuries to individuals residing within the state. These quasi-sovereign
interests have included the health, comfort and welfare of the people . . . .
West Virginia v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079, 1089 (2d Cir. 1971); see also
Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554–60 (1966).
436. See Quarles, 158 U.S. at 538 (“[A] conspiracy to injure, oppress, threaten, or
intimidate him in the free exercise or enjoyment of this right, or because of his having
exercised it, is punishable . . . .”).
437. Id. at 536 (“[I]t is the duty of that government to see that he may exercise this
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individuals give up the unrestrained right to act as they think fit; in
return, each has a positive right to society’s protection.” Montesquieu
describes this civil liberty as “that tranquillity of spirit which comes
from the opinion each one has of his security, and in order for him to
have this liberty the government must be such that one citizen cannot
fear another citizen.”438
Citizens also have a duty to assist in prosecuting and securing the
punishment of those who violate the law.439 Furthermore, citizens have
a duty to testify in criminal prosecutions.440 In fact, if an individual is a
material witness in a criminal prosecution, and refuses to appear in
court, the law provides for the arrest and incarceration of that person
until trial.441
Because citizens have a constitutional duty to report criminal activity
and assist in its prosecution, it follows axiomatically that citizens have a
constitutional right to testify at trial. As the Quarles court observed, the
right of a “private citizen . . . [to] assis[t] in putting in motion the course
of justice” and the right “to act as part of the posse comitatus in
upholding the laws” of this country, are secured by the Constitution.442
Because prosecuting criminal cases involves trials and trial testimony, it
necessarily follows that a witness has a constitutional right to testify at
those trials.443 The government has the duty to protect its citizens’ right
right freely, and to protect him from violence while so doing, or on account of so
doing.”).
438. People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596, 603 (Cal. 1997) (quoting
MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 157 (1889)).
439. Quarles, 158 U.S. at 535.
It is the duty and the right, not only of every peace officer of the United States,
but of every citizen, to assist in prosecuting, and in securing the punishment of,
any breach of the peace of the United States. It is the right, as well as the duty,
of every citizen . . . to act as part of the posse comitatus in upholding the laws
of his country.
Id.; see also Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 600 (1896); Roviaro v. United States, 353
U.S. 53, 59 (1957).
440. Piemonte v. United States, 367 U.S. 556, 559 n.2 (1961) (“Every citizen of
course owes to his society the duty of giving testimony to aid in the enforcement of the
law.”); see also Brown, 161 U.S. at 600.
441. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 881 (West 1985 & Supp. 2002); id. § 1332 (West
1982 & Supp. 2002).
442. Quarles, 158 U.S. at 535–36.
443. See United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 626 (5th Cir. 1982) (“We conclude,
therefore, that Quarles implicitly overruled Sanges, and the Supreme Court’s reasoning
controls this case. Thus we hold that the right to testify at trial is one secured by the
Constitution . . . .”).
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to testify and to guard against any interference with this right by
violence or intimidation.444
Government’s duty to protect witnesses in criminal prosecutions arises
for several reasons. First, acts of violence and threats of violence are not
protected by the Constitution.445 Second, fear for one’s own safety or
the safety of his family does not legally excuse a witness from his duty
to testify.446 Third, it would be unconscionable for government to
impose duties and obligations on its citizenry, exposing them to the
possibility of harm or danger, and then fail to assist them. Finally,
individuals who perform their civic duty benefit society and, in turn,
have a right to society’s protection.447 Even prisoners in custody have a
constitutional right to be protected against violence committed against
them while in custody, and government has a corresponding duty to
protect them against assault or injury.448
In summary, witnesses have a constitutional right to report whatever
knowledge they have of criminal activity to law enforcement, to assist
with its prosecution, and to testify at trial. An accused has a
constitutional right to confront his accusers and have them testify in
court before the trier of fact. When an accused threatens or attacks a
witness, he has not only waived this right, but has violated the
constitutional rights of that witness in an attempt to obtain an advantage
for himself. Thus, he has committed another crime—a violation of that
witness’s rights.
He has also impliedly verified the witness’s
prospective testimony else the attack or threat would make no sense.
444. See Quarles, 158 U.S. at 536 (“[I]t is the duty of that government to see that he
may exercise this right freely, and to protect him from violence while so doing, or on
account of so doing.” (quoting Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 662 (1884))); see also
Piemonte, 367 U.S. at 559 n.2 (“Every citizen of course owes to his society the duty of
giving testimony to aid in the enforcement of the law . . . . The Government of course
has an obligation to protect its citizens from harm.” (citations omitted)).
445. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 484 (1993); Roberts v. Jaycees, 468 U.S.
609, 628 (1984).
446. Piemonte, 367 U.S. at 559 n.2 (“Neither before the Court of Appeals nor here
was fear for himself or his family urged by Piemonte as a valid excuse from testifying.
Nor would this be a legal excuse. Every citizen of course owes to his society the duty of
giving testimony to aid in the enforcement of the law.” (emphasis added)).
447. See Ex Parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 662 (1884); Quarles, 158 U.S. at 536;
see also 18 U.S.C. § 241 (2000) (making criminal a conspiracy “to injure, oppress,
threaten, or intimidate [any citizen] in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or
privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States . . . .”).
448. Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263, 284 (1892).
The United States, having the absolute right to hold such prisoners, have an
equal duty to protect them, while so held, against assault or injury from any
quarter. The existence of that duty on the part of the government necessarily
implies a corresponding right of the prisoners to be so protected; and this right
of the prisoners is a right secured to them by the Constitution . . . .
Id.
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By virtue of the threat facing the witness, and the defendant’s ability
to have that threat realized, the witness under current law can be placed
in a witness protection program.449 That placement results in the loss of
those constitutional rights granted to all citizens, such as freedom of
association,450 which includes the creation and sustenance of a family,
marriage, educating and raising children, and cohabitation with one’s
relatives;451 the right to life and liberty;452 the right to freedom of
personal choice in the matters of family life;453 the right to freely travel;
the right to establish one’s home and move about at will;454 the right to
contract and engage in any of the common occupations of life; and the
right to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.455
Loss of these rights are significant, especially to one who has not
committed a wrong and who has performed his or her moral and civic
duty. In reality, the stakes are as high, if not higher, for the threatened
witness as for the accused. The accused in a noncapital case faces
incarceration and loss of liberty. The witness, who is innocent of any
crime, is facing the real possibility of loss of life to himself or herself or
a loved one, and the loss of freedom to live his or her chosen life,
associate with their friends and family, and work at his or her chosen
profession.
Furthermore, a program’s protection may be for a limited period of
time. For example, placement in California’s witness protection
program is only for six months, with an outside limit of nine months if

449. The Alvarado court acknowledged the serious nature and magnitude of the
problem of witness intimidation, and that it is crucial for government to provide
protection to those witnesses. Yet the court admitted that none of the procedures in
place, including the witness protection program, can guarantee the safety of a witness,
but only help to reduce the risks the witness faces. This is borne out by the fact that
every day government forgoes prosecution in many cases where evidence essential to the
defense would jeopardize a witness’s life. Alvarado v. Superior Court, 5 P.3d 203,
222–23 (Cal. 2000).
450. See Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 617–19.
451. Id.
452. See Logan, 144 U.S. at 287; People v. Olivas, 551 P.2d 375, 384 (Cal. 1976).
453. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 176 (1976).
454. Roberts v. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617–20 (1984); Santosky v. Kramer, 455
U.S. 745, 753 (1982); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 176 (1976); Aptheker v.
Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 505 (1969).
455. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1922); see also Jaycees, 468 U.S.
at 622.
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necessary.456 That exposes the individual to retaliatory acts when the
protection ends. It is important to remember the words of our Supreme
Court, that “justice though due to the accused, is due to the accuser
also.”457
The public has an interest in the fair administration of justice, the
conviction of those who are guilty and the adjudication of criminal trials
in a setting which promotes confidence in the adversary process.458 The
courts are charged with protecting the public interest by giving the
prosecution a fair opportunity to prove its cases against those who have
violated the law.459 The public has an important interest that trials be
fair and that they result in a just judgment.460 One who jeopardizes these
interests truly jeopardizes the very structure of society.
Although already stated, the following is worth repeating:
Society reaps enormous benefits when a witness’s testimony succeeds in
getting a criminal off the street and placed behind bars. Society must be willing
to pay for that benefit by affording necessary protection to both the witness and
his family, for the threat of violence against a witness’s family will often silence
the witness. Without a continuing and visible public commitment to such
protection, it is unrealistic to expect citizens to come forward and provide
information so critical to the successful operation of the criminal justice system.
To the extent that government fails to meet this essential responsibility, it cedes
control of our cities to the criminals.461

State legislatures as well recognize that all individuals have a right “to
be secure and protected from fear, intimidation, and physical harm
caused by the activities of violent groups and individuals.”462 When
confrontation becomes a problem because of a defendant’s action, logic
dictates that the innocent person should not be the one who suffers. The
Sixth Amendment is meant to protect the accused from overreaching by
the government, not from his own misdeeds.463 Therefore, when the
witnesses’ rights, duties, and obligations are balanced against the
defendant’s right of confrontation, the moral equation tips in favor of the
witness.
The President’s Task Force on Victims of Crime found such a serious
imbalance between the rights of crime victims and the rights of criminal
defendants, that it proposed an amendment to the United States
Constitution to provide crime victims with “the right to be present and to
456.
457.
458.
459.
460.
461.
462.
463.
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be heard at all critical stages of judicial proceedings.”464 Just recently,
President Bush and other members of the government have also called
for a “constitutional amendment to protect the rights of violent-crime
victims” because “the 8 million victims of violent crime each year have
too often had their rights ignored in the criminal justice system.”465 The
amendment was characterized as “the right thing to do” because “too
often . . . the rights of these victims have been overlooked or ignored.”466
Attorney General Ashcroft opined: “It is time—it is past time—to
balance the scales of justice, to demand fairness and judicial integrity not
just for the accused but for the aggrieved as well.”467 As proposed, the
amendment would have seven procedural rights for violent crime
victims, including “the right to have their safety considered.”468
VI. CONCLUSION
Waiver by misconduct should apply in cases of witness intimidation
and witness attacks. Application of the doctrine is consistent with the
principle that the right of cross-examination may be limited for reasons
of public policy, witness safety, or because of the necessities of the
case.469 As shown, applying the waiver doctrine is equitable, promotive
of several important public policies, and justified by the weighing of the
rights of the witness against those of the defendant.470
Due process of law requires that the proceedings shall be fair, but fairness is a
relative, not an absolute concept. It is fairness with reference to particular conditions
or particular results. “The due process clause does not impose upon the States a duty
to establish ideal systems for the administration of justice, with every modern
improvement and with provision against every possible hardship that may befall.”
What is fair in one set of circumstances may be an act of tyranny in others.471

464. Dean G. Kilpatrick et al., The Rights of Crime Victims—Does Legal Protection
Make a Difference?, NAT’L INST. JUSTICE, Dec. 1998, at 1; see President’s Task Force
on Victims of Crime Final Report, WASHINGTON, D.C. 114 (Dec. 1982).
465. Eric Lichtblau, Victims’ Bill Gets Backing, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2002, at A10.
466. Id.
467. Id.
468. Id. (emphasis added).
469. See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986); Chambers v.
Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243
(1895).
470. See Clark v. Ricketts, 958 F.2d 851, 855 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v.
Fuentes, 988 F. Supp. 861, 866 (E.D. Pa. 1997); United States v. Varelli, 407 F.2d 735,
750 (7th Cir. 1969).
471. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 116–17 (1934) (quoting Ownbey v.
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When confrontation becomes impossible due to actions committed by
the one who would assert that right, and would benefit thereby, logic
dictates that the right has been waived.472 Else, a defendant can, with
impunity, threaten or attack a witness. If suppression of the witness’s
identification is deemed a confrontation violation, then the following
scenarios result: the witness refuses to testify and the defendant achieves
his purpose of preventing the admission of relevant, material, and crucial
evidence before the trier of fact and the criminal prosecution is
dismissed; or, he learns the identity of the witness which thus enables
the initial threat to be executed; or, the witness testifies, enters a witness
protection program for a limited time and forfeits his or her
constitutional rights, including those the defendant has violated, and
when out of the program is still subject to retaliatory attacks. In each
scenario, the defendant benefits from his wrongful conduct and is
allowed to misuse the very process of the court and adversary system put
in place for his protection, for malicious ends and in violation of the
dictates of Reynolds, Mattox, and Diaz.473 This cannot and should not be
the law.
The Court has consistently refused to set a fixed rule as to when
disclosure is required.474 Thus, it is appropriate to interpret Smith as not
requiring disclosure of witness identity in all cases, and certainly not in
the case of the threatened witness who does not have the credibility
issues present in Alvarado.475
Furthermore, even though the Smith Court found that “when the
credibility of a witness is in issue, the very starting point in ‘exposing
falsehoods and bringing out the truth’ through cross-examination must
necessarily be to ask the witness who he is and where he lives,”476 Smith
did not involve a threatened witness, and did involve a witness with
credibility issues.477 At trial, the prosecutor did not provide the Court
with any reason which might have justified the refusal to provide the
witness’s name and address.478 Nor did the Smith Court say that such
Morgan, 256 U.S. 94, 110 (1921)).
472. See United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 630 (5th Cir. 1982).
473. See id. (“To permit such subversion of a criminal prosecution . . . [would]
make a mockery of the system of justice that the right was designed to protect.”).
474. See, e.g., McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 310–11 (1967); Roviaro v. United
States, 353 U.S. 53, 62 (1957).
475. United States v. Rangel, 534 F.2d 147, 148 (9th Cir. 1976) (stating that Smith
“does not establish a rigid rule of disclosure, but rather discusses disclosure against a
background of factors weighing conversely such as personal safety of the witness”); see
also Siegfriedt v. Fair, 982 F.2d 14, 17 (1st Cir. 1992); United States v. Varella, 692 F.2d
1352, 1355 (11th Cir. 1982).
476. Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129, 131 (1968).
477. Id. at 130.
478. Id. at 134 (White, J., concurring).
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disclosure was required in all cases under all circumstances. In fact, the
Court affirmed that a trial court has a duty to protect witnesses from
certain questions,479 including those which “endanger the personal safety
of the witness.”480
The Court has often noted that exceptions to the Sixth Amendment
privilege may be enlarged from time to time, as long as the exceptions
are consistent with the spirit of the law.481 The purpose of the Clause is
the promotion of the integrity of the trial process and its truth seeking
function, and the administration of justice. Waiver by misconduct is
consistent with this aim, because it penalizes those who attempt to
subvert the trial process and undermine the integrity of the criminal
prosecution.
Furthermore, “cross-examination is not improperly curtailed if the
[trier of fact] is in possession of facts sufficient to make a
‘discriminating appraisal’ of the particular witness’s credibility.”482 As
stated earlier, cross-examination is used to impeach credibility and
expose witness bias, if any. “So long as a reasonably complete picture
of the witness’s veracity, bias and motivation is developed,”
appropriate boundaries of cross-examination may be set.483 Certainly
the prosecution can provide all necessary discovery relevant to the
protected witness’s credibility to the defense without disclosing that
witness’s identity.484
479. Smith, 390 U.S. at 133.
480. Id. at 133–34 (White, J., concurring); see also Clark v. Ricketts, 958 F.2d 851,
855 (9th Cir. 1992); Varella, 692 F.2d at 1355 (“A well-recognized limitation on the
right to cross-examine a witness occurs when a disclosure of the information sought
would endanger the physical safety of the witness or his family.”); United States v.
Twomey, 460 F.2d 400, 403 (7th Cir. 1972); United States v. Ellis, 468 F.2d 638, 639
(9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Palermo, 410 F.2d 468, 472 (7th Cir. 1969) (“[W]here
there is a threat to the life of the witness, the right of the defendant to have the witness’
true name, address and place of employment is not absolute.”).
481. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 107 (1934) (“The exceptions are not
even static, but may be enlarged from time to time, if there is no material departure from
the reason of the general rule.”).
482. United States v. Sasso, 59 F.2d 341, 347 (2d Cir. 1995).
483. United States v. McLaughlin, 957 F.2d 12, 17 (1st Cir. 1992).
484. This should not be interpreted to imply that defense counsel cannot be trusted
with that information. Rather, it is life’s experience that dissemination of information
occurs in many ways, deliberate and accidental. Many people have access to confidential
information which is being transcribed, copied, or left on a desk. People other than a
defense attorney have access to defense materials as a necessary part of the working
process, such as investigators, paralegals, clerks, typists, and messengers. Thus, once the
information is given out, it may accidentally arrive in the wrong hands.

1241

FINALCASSANI2.DOC

2/4/2020 12:58 PM

If this is not an acceptable solution, then the trial court could appoint
an independent attorney and investigator, who would be given the
identification information and then create their own discovery on the
credibility of that protected witness. That information would then be
turned over to the defense team so that, at least, an added layer of
protection would prevent disclosure of the witness’s identity.
One judge said that we cannot expect jurors to take their chances on
what might happen to them as a result of a guilty verdict.485 Neither
should witnesses be expected to take a chance on what might happen to
them if they testify.
Principles of morality, culpability, and responsibility are the heart
of criminal jurisprudence.486 The Sixth Amendment was not intended
and “does not stand as a shield to protect an accused from his own
[misdeeds].”487 Just as a defendant who murders a witness to prevent
that witness from testifying ought not be permitted to invoke the right
of confrontation to prohibit the use of the witness’s hearsay
statement,488 a defendant should not be afforded the protection of the
Clause if he makes the identification of a witness an invitation to
murder. As one wise Justice stated, there is the danger that “if the
Court does not temper its . . . logic, with a little practical wisdom, it
will convert the constitutional Bill of Rights into a suicide pact.”489
To hold that the liberty of [individuals] . . . must be forfeited to preserve the
illusion of freedom for those whose ill conduct is deleterious to the community
as a whole is to ignore half the political promise of the Constitution and the
whole of its sense. The freedom to leave one’s house and move about at will,
and to have a measure of personal security is “implicit in ‘the concept of
ordered liberty’” enshrined in the history and basic constitutional documents of
English-speaking people. Preserving the peace is the first duty of government,
and it is for the protection of the community from predations of the idle, the
contentious and the brutal that government was invented.490

Witness intimidation raises concern not just for the well being of the
targeted individual, but for the entire judicial process. Those concerns
justify a limitation of the defendant’s rights where the government’s
obligation to maintain order in society is at stake.491
485. United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359, 1364 (1985).
486. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 n.4 (1951).
487. United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1359 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Rouco, 765 F.2d 983, 995 (11th Cir. 1985); see Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 458
(1912).
488. See Carlson, 547 F.2d at 1359.
489. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
490. People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 928 P.2d 596, 618 (Cal. 1997) (citing Wolf v.
Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27–28 (1949)).
491. See Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242–43 (1895); Diaz v. United States,
223 U.S. 442, 460 (1912); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 116–17, 122 (1934).
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The beyond a reasonable doubt standard reflects the value society
places on individual freedom and the immense importance it places on
an individual’s life and liberty.492 Is it not also true that the same value,
the same concern, and the same consideration should apply to the life
and liberty of witnesses and victims, who willingly perform their civic
duty, risk their lives, and assist in the apprehension and prosecution of
criminal activities? Are not their lives and their right to freedom just as
valuable, just as precious? And if not, why not?

492.

See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970).
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VII. APPENDIX

CALIFORNIA WITNESS PROTECTION PROGRAM

Attachment 1

CALIFORNIA WITNESS PROTECTIONPROGRAM
Witness Advisement

Per Section 14025, Title 7.5 ofthe California Penal Code, the Witness Advisement shall be inwriting and
shall specify the responsibilities of the protectedperson that establish the conditions for the CWPP.
District Attorney's Office: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Contract Number: _ _ _ _ __
Witness Name and I. D. Number: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
The protected person/witness shall agree toall of the following:
I, _ _ _ _ _ _ __, dohereby agree to doall of the belowconditions while in the California
(print name)
Witness Protection Program.
► testify truthfully in andprovide all necessary information to appropriatelaw enforcement officials
concerning all criminal proceedings(_ witness initials);
► obey all laws L witness initials);
► take all necessary steps to avoiddetectionby others d111ing the period of protection
L witness initials);
► comply with all legal obligations and civil judgments L_ witness intitials);
► cooperate with all reasonable requests from officials providing the protection
L_ witness initials);
► disclose all outstanding legal obligations, including those concerning child custody and visitation
rights L witness initials);
► disclose any probation or paroleresponsibilities L witness initials); and
► regularly infonn the appropriate district attorney's office or law enforcement designee of his/her
activities and c111rent address (_ witness initials).
► Fail111eto complywith any of the above may be a condition for tennination from the program
L witness initials).
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ (<ii signature)
Witness

Date

I have explained each of the above conditions tothe witness, and he/she has acknowledged and agreed to
all of the conditions.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ (<ii signature)
District Attorney Designee
CWPP 3 (12/99)
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CALIFORNIA WITNESS PROTECTION PROGRAM

Attachment 2

CALIFORNIA WIT N ESS PROTECTION PROGRAM
APPLICATION

STA TE OF CALIFORNIA
Mail to
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
CALIFORNIA WITNESS PROTECTION
PROGRAM
APPLICATION

California Department of Justice
California Bureau of Inv estigation/CWPP
P.O. Box 163029
Sacram ento, CA 958 16-3029
A ttn: CWPP Program Analyst

Date
I.

REQUESTING DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE/WITNESS COORDINATOR
District Attorney's Office

II.

District Attorney Representative

Office

Nameffitle

Business Address

A ddress

Phone #:

Phone #:

Agen cy Case #:

Investigating Officer:

CASE INFORMATION

Briefly describe the case in which the witness is testifying; and explain h ow it constitutes a gang-related
crim e, organized crime, narcotic trafficking crllne, or some other crime that creates a high degree of risk
to the witness. If possible, attach the crim e repor t If m ore room is n ecessary, please type on additional
page and attach

Has a complaint or indictment been filed, or does the submitting agency intend to seek a complaint or indictment?
Yes 1 No 1
Court Case# - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Case Nam e: - - - - - - - - - - Defendants Being
Prosecuted

III.

DOB

CII

Charges Filed

C ustody
Yes/No

THREAT INFORMATION

Articulate the credible ev idence of a substantial danger the w itness may suffer due to intimidation or
r etaliatory v iolence.

CWPP I (12/99)

(Page I of2)
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CALIFORNIA WITNESS PROTECTION PROGRAM

IV. WITNESSINFORMATION
N AME (1 )

NAME(2)

AKA

AKA

DOB

DOB

Cl!

Cl!

CDL

CDL

List family, friends, or associates who will also be protected:
NAME

V.

DOB

RELATIONSHIP TO WITNESS

WITNESS ASSISTANCENEEDED

Period of time assistance needed (six-month limit): Beginning date: ____ Ending date : _ _ __
Essential Expenses Requested:
Relocation
:$
:$ _ _ _/days for _ _ days
Motel
:$_ _ _/days for _ _ days
Meals
:$_ _ _/days for _ _ days
Incidentals
:$ _ __ /mo. for
Apartment
mos.
:$_ _ _Imo. for
Meals
mos
Utilities
:$
Imo. for
m os.
:$
Incidentals
Imo. for
mos.
:$
Deposits
Other ( explain) :$
/mo. for
m os.
:$
Total Amount

Financial Assistance Received by W itness
Salary
$
Imo.
$_ _Imo.
Child Support
Disability
$_ _Imo.
Welfare
$- -Imo.
Other (explain)
$_ _Imo.
$
Total Amount:

$_ _Imo.

Monthly Debts

Were other available funding sources utilized before applying to the CWPP? Yes i No i
Is the witness currently receiving financial assistance form the State of California Board of Control,
Victims of Crime Program? Yes 1 No 1 If yes, please explain. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ (""signature)
District Attorney Designee

1 Approved 1 D isapproved

FOR CWPP PROGRAM USE ONLY

CWPP Analyst

Date

CWPP Manager

Date

CWPP 1 (12/99)
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CALIFORNIA WITNESS PROTECTION PROGRAM
CWPP AGREEMENT

Attachment 3

(To be completed by CWPP Program Analyst Only)

STATE OF CALIFORNIA
DEPARTMENT OF rusncE
CALIFORNIA WITNESS
PROTECTION PROGRAM
CWPP AGREEMENT FY 99/2000
\ NEW

\RENEWAL

Mail To:

I AMEND:MENT (NO

I AGREEMENT NO .

District Attorney's Office
Office

California Department of Justice
California Bureau oflnvestigation/CWPP
P.O. Box 163029
Sacramento, CA 95816-3029
Attn: CWPP Program Analyst
\AGENCY NO

District Attorney Representative
Namefritle

Sacramento Coun

District Attorne ' s Office

Jose h Smith, De u

Address

Telephone Number

1200 Town S uare, Sacramento, CA

(916) 444-4444

District Attome

DIGEST OF CONT
The California Witness rotection Program (CWPP), Title 7.5, Section 14021-1 033, of the California
Penal Code, will Provid
·
·
ttorney' s Office for the
protection of one witness identified as Witness # _ _ _ , endangered as a result of their involvement in a
criminal matter

Terms and Conditions: Reimbursement will be for relocation expenses, semi-permanent housing first and
last months rent, rental and utility deposits, monthly rent, meals, utilities, and incidentals, in accordance
with the California Witness Protection Program Policy and Procedures Manual governing witness
protection services
(Each district attorney 's office must maintain a record oforiginal receipts for expenditures applied for the protection of witnesses)

DOLLAR AMOUNT$$ _ _ _ (Chapter 50/99) PERIOD OF PERFORMANCE _ _ To _ __

REASON FOR CONTRACT (IDENTIFY SPECIFIC PROBLEM MAKING lHE CONTRACT NECESSARY)
The life of the witness is in danger due to their involvement in a criminal matter. CWPP funds will provide
for the witness' continued protection until the case is concluded or financial assistance is no longer deemed
necessary by the district attorney's office of as determined by the CWPP.

DESCRIBE THE SERVICE WHICH WILL RESULT
WERE OTHER FUNDING SOURCES UTILIZED BEFORE APPL YING WITH THE CWPP?
Yes ! N o l

Authorized Signature of District Attorney's Office

Signature of Program Analyst

Date

Date

CWPP 2 (12/99)
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Attachment 4

Date

CALIFORNIA WITNESS PROTECTION PROGRAM
REIMBURSEMENT REQUEST LETTER
(use district attorney' s office letterhead)

-----------

California Department of Justice
California Bureau of Investigation/CWPP
P.O. Box 163029
Sacramento, CA 95816-3029
Attn: CWPP Program Analyst

RE CWPP Agreement #_ ~ - - Witness Identification #

- - - - -

As provided in CWPP Agreement # - ~ - - - - - this office is requesting reirn bursement of monies
spent while protecting Confidential Witness #
and
family members
The expenses incurred we
es) during the period of

This represents a
$ _ _ _ _ _ _ The bre

I verify that all require'd==1:n:s-1m,---mr,mrtmm,;ctiJ,y-the-drs:trn::rartrnm,y,s-ulfrc:<! pertaining to the above
specified expenses.
Please send the reimbursement monies to _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
District Attorney' s Office

Unit

Address

State

Zip Code

Signed
(title/office)

Mail to :
California Department of Justice
California Bureau oflnvestigation/CWPP
P.O . Box 163029
Sacramento, CA 95816-3029
Attn: CWPP Analyst
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Attachment 5

CALIFORNIA WITNESS PROTECTION PROGRAM
LIST OF EXPENDITURES

CWPP Aggreeement#:___________

Date: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Witness Identification # : _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
RELOCATION
Relocated on:
Relocated by:
If personal vehicle used, _ _ x M iles x $.31
Moving Van/Trailer Expenses
Other Moving Expenses
Storage of personal possessions

Amount:$
Amount:$
Amount:$
Amount:$
Subtotal:$

LODGING AND MEALS
Local Protection (residence)
Mortgage Month:
Meal Month:
Incidentals:

Amount:$
Amount:$
Amount:$
Subtotal: $

Temporary Lodging !hotel/motel)
Lodging Dates:
Meal Dates:
Incidental Dates:

Amount:$
Amount:$
Amount:$
Subtotal:$

Semi-perm anent Lodging (apartment/house)
Rent Month:
Meal Month:
Incidentals:

Amount:$
Amount:$
Amount:$
Subtotal: $

Permanent Lodging ( apartm ent/house)
Rent Month:
Meal Month:
Incidentals:

Amount:
Amount:
Amount:
Subtotal:

$
$
$
$

Utilities (need prior CWPP approval)
Type of Service:
Billing Dates:
Utility Deposits:
CWPP 4 ( 12/99)

Amount:$
Amount:$
Subtotal:$
(Page I of 2)
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CALIFORNIA WITNESS PROTECTION PROGRAM

ARMED PROTECTION OR ESCORT
Time Period from: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ to _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Number of protection and/or escort personnel _ _ _ __
Overtime hours and costs devo ted to armed protection or escort services _ _ _ (OT Hrs)

Amount$

Transportation costs devoted to armed protection or escort services

Amount $

Per diem costs devoted to armed protection or escort services

.ArnoWlt $

Lodging costs devoted to armed protection or escort sen.rices

Amount $

(Please attach separate sheet for breakdown of e>.penses)

Subtotal Costs $

ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW IDENTITY
Include narrativ e of functions a nd costs related to the establishment of new identity

Subtotal Costs $

HEALTHCARE
Include narrative of functions and costs related to health care

Subtotal Costs $

Grand Total

$

I verify that all required receipts are maintained by the district attorney's office pertaining to the above
specified expenses.

Authorized Signature of District Attorney 's Office
l Approved 1 Disapproved

CWPP Primary Analyst

1250

Date
FOR CWPP PROGRAM USE ONLY
Date

FINALCASSANI2.DOC

2/4/2020 12:58 PM

The Waiver Doctrine After Alvarado

[VOL. 39: 1165, 2002]

SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

C4LIFORNL4 WITNESS PROTECTION PROGRAM

Attachment 6

CALIFORNIA WITNESS PROTECTION PROGRAM
AMENDMENT REQUEST LETTER
(Print on agency letterhead)
Date

California Department of Justice
California Bureau of Investigation
California Witness Protection Program
P.O. Box 163029
Sacramento, CA 95816-3029
Attn: CWPP Program Analyst

We are requesting an Am
agreement's period of per
We are requesting$ _ __,___
include
also requesting an extensi

toaP:Me

t
o

is

di

d

Wit # _ _ - The current

ate
tion witness services to
A breakdown of the am unts is attached. We are
_ _ _ _ _ to _ _ _ _ _ __

If you have any questions, please contact _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ at ( ) _ _ - _ _ _ - Our fax
number is ( ) _ _ - _ _ -

Sincerely,

Authorizd Signature of District Attorney's Office
Representative's Title
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Attachment 7

CALIFORNIA WITNESS PROTECTION PROGRAM
QUESTIONNAIRE

The CWPP w ould appreciate your cooperation in completing this questionnaire. Your candid responses
are extremely valuable in assessing the effectiveness of the CWPP.
District A ttorney's Office :_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ CWPP Agreement # :_ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Witness Identification #: - - - - - - - - - - - - - N umber of Family M embers A ssisted: _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Relationship(s) :_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Results of Trial
Defendant Name

Convicted Of

Sentence

If case is still pending, anticipated trial date is: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Did defendant(s) plead guilty?
Yes N o
Did witness' testimony attribute to the guilty plea?
Yes N o
Could case go to trial without testimony of witness?
Yes N o
Would witness have testified without protection?
Yes N o
Was your request handled expeditiously?
Yes N o
Were any problems encountered?
Yes N o
Explain: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

What additional services would you like to see provided by the CWPP?

D o you have any comments and/or suggestions concerning the C\VPP, its policy, or procedures?

(signature/title)

(date)

CW PP 5 (12/99)
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